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ABSTRACT

Since World War II, the American balance-of-payments
situation has presented a multifaceted problem.

This study is

an attempt to show some of the interrelated and overlapping
political, economic, military and diplomatic aspects of this
problem.

Of the key factors involved, international trade and

foreign aid programs have been of primary significance.

Pro

posed solutions, however, have reflected highly diverse opinion
on both the national and international levels.
No immediate resolution to the problem has emerged,
partly because of the democratic system of government in the
United States and partly because of the limited reforms which
have been agreed to in the international monetary system.

It

is not expected that this problem will be solved easily or
quickly for two reasons.

First, the failure to curb adequately

domestic inflation has reduced American competitiveness in
world markets, and, secondly,

a continuing commitment to the

foreign aid program has been made.
Finally, recurring crises in the future are a very real
possibility.

Given the complexity of the problem, however,

careful deliberation and experimentation seem warranted even at
the expense of immediate resolution.
vii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the period following World War II, foreign finance ha
assumed an increasingly controversial and political role in the
process of American foreign policy determination.

Prior to this

period, the subject of international economics had been super
seded by such immediately critical and pressing concerns as the
conduct of world war; postwar recovery of the combatants, prin
cipally Western Europe and Japan; and, the resumption of hos
tilities in the form of the Cold War.

International relations

in the earlier part of the post-World War II period, therefore,
were primarily conducted on the basis of political inclinations
and alignments, while economic policy served as an adjunct.
Relegating economic considerations to an auxiliary role,
however, ignored the economic trauma of the 1930Ts.

That eco

nomic crisis, unfortunately, did not result in significant inter
national monetary reform.

With the outbreak of war, followed by

high production levels, and, finally, economic assistance pro
grams inaugurated to reestablish economic stability throughout
the Western countries, the need for such reform was overshadowed
With the recovery of Western Europe, economic competi
tiveness necessarily resulted.

Concurrently, the United States

had become involved in a continuing global program of foreign
1
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economic assistance.

While recognizing the capabilities and po

tentialities of a highly developed and internationally competi
tive country, the complexities of maintaining this competitiveness
and administering a foreign aid program have created an economic
problem with such strong political overtones and implications
that it touches upon domestic as well as foreign policy; the role
of government as well as the responsibility of industry; and, the
challenge to American leadership from the recovered Western
European countries as well as Communist countries of the world.
This economic problem which touches upon so many aspects
of domestic as well as foreign policy was acknowledged only after
it had independently manifested itself, thereby requiring a reso
lution.

Since 1958, this economic problem has been known as the

American balance-of-payments problem.

In 1958, the United States

of America experienced for the first time in the post-World
War II era, a deficit rather than a surplus in its international
transactions.

Consequently, economists, government officials,

and many laymen became virtually obsessed with the balance-ofpayments problem, and created a proliferation of studies and
proposed solutions.

Public and governmental response to the

continuous debate and publicity surrounding this deficit, and
the apparent difficulty in correcting or altering it, has been
one of confusion, fear, and, in general, concern for an effective
means of returning the United States to its former economic role,
that of a creditor rather than a debtor nation.
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Such a position of being a creditor as opposed to a
debtor nation was accompanied by a certain degree of economic
prestige, thus implying recognition of the strength of the Amer
ican currency.

Furthermore, this strong position allowed the

differentiation if not, indeed, the divorce of domestic and in
ternational economic policy considerations.

Therefore, these

two areas could, and did for a time, remain separate without the
exaction of political damages.
With the decline and fall of the American dollar, how
ever, both these advantages have been altered.

While prolonged

and unchallenged economic leadership could not have been realis
tically expected in any case, vestiges of temporary preeminence
have endured.

These are reflected in attitudes toward the flow

of capital, unquestioning confidence in the dollar, export and
import policies, and, particularly, policies which affect price
levels, employment, and internal growth.

In other words, there

has been a decided reluctance to acknowledge and deal effectively
with the connection and interaction between foreign and domestic
economic policy.
The advent of a deficit, accompanied by a loss of un
challenged international prestige, has shaken this blind faith
in the immortality of the American dollar.

Furthermore, during

the past decade, it has become increasingly apparent that the
United States cannot easily, if indeed it can at all, return to
its former position of unchallenged economic leadership.

While

a number oF complex issues are in part responsible for this

4

relative decline, two areas, those of international trade and
foreign aid, both economic and military, have been very signifi
cant in creating the present situation.
In the area of trade, the United States has been increas
ingly challenged by the recovery and emergence of both Western
Europe and Japan.

Although this recovery was intended, and, in

fact, considerably aided by the United States, certain accom
panying effects were not.

These include substantial and con

tinued foreign investments, short-term capital loans, and the
transference of technological expertise.

In addition, conflicting

domestic policies have also contributed to the decline of the
United States trade position in relation to that of other indus
trial nations.
In contrast to the declining position in international
trade, America, since the close of World War II, has steadily
increased its commitment to a foreign aid program without any
other serious contenders for leadership in the Western world.
From the recovery of Western Europe, America turned to the Third
World.

This action was largely in response to Russia’s emergence

from World War II as a powerful and apparently serious competitor
for world leadership in whatever areas possible.

Furthermore,

this competition was increasingly reflected not only in the
militaristic armaments race, but also in the economic assistance
contest.

Such ideological competition between communism and

capitalism aimed at winning over underdeveloped countries has
spawned a form of hostility referred to as economic warfare.

5

The expense and emphasis on this warfare has, necessarily, af
fected the American balance~of-pa.yments problem.
On the other hand, the fundamental question regarding
both trade and aid seems to be, how significant is this deficit
in relation to the balance of payments, considering the strength
and potential of America's national economy?

Is it really only

one abstraction among many which must be weighed as such?

Or,

can retaining confidence in the dollar actually be translated
and demonstrated in concrete causes and effects?
To answer these questions, the relationship between the
goals of domestic policy and those of foreign policy must be
recognized.

With the international leadership role which the

United States has assumed, foreign and domestic decisions can no
longer be differentiated, for the one directly affects the other.
Therefore, the balance-of-payments deficit, which has received
much attention both politically and economically in the 1960Ts,
must be viewed as both a national and an international problem,
mutually inclusive.
Consequently, this dollar crisis, if in fact it is a.
crisis, must necessarily be dealt with on both economic and
political levels.

In short, choices and alternatives must be

explained as a. prerequisite to deciding priorities and insuring
general public acceptance.
Prior to discussing current choices and alternatives,
however, there is a need for historical perspective.

In com

parison to and unlike European countries, the United States is

G

experiencing a balance-of-payments problem only as a recent
phenomenon.

For the period following the economic crisis of the

early 1930’s until the late 1950’s, universal acceptance of the
dollar was unquestioned.

During this period, then, neither the

balance of payments nor the international monetary system was of
particular interest or concern to the American public.

This

international strength of the dollar, however, actually helped
to precipitate the deficit which first appeared in 1958.
What, then, preceded and culminated in the climactic
year of 1958?

The answer to this question dates hack to the

close of World War II.
nomically prostrate.

At that time, Western Europe was eco
America, in contrast, represented economic

security and stability.

Consequently, large outflows of gold

moved from Western Europe to the United States.

Not only were

these outflows encouraged by the strength of the dollar, hut also
by the United States’ extensive transactions with the rest of the
world.
Following World War II, the demand for American products
appeared to he unquenchable.

Furthermore, only two currencies,

the dollar and the Swiss franc, could be converted into any other
national currency upon demand because currencies other than these
two were hampered by the complications of numerous exchange con
trols. ' Therefore, America was not only catapulted into world

^James Tobin, National Economic Pol-icy (New Haven:
University Press, 1966), p. 187.

Yale
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economic leadership by the ruin of Western Europe, but also
obtained possession of the largest supply of gold among the
Western nations, and achieved the distinction of being a leader
in world export production.

It was this latter condition, rooted

in the seemingly insatiable appetite of foreign countries for
United States products, services, and securities, that may have
insured the value of the dollar far more than an over-abundant
2
gold supply.
Under these circumstances, supplemented by efficient
financial organization in the United States, the dollar grew into
a reserve currency.

While gold remained the primary asset, dol

lars became increasingly popular in place of, or in combination
with, gold.

Essentially, two reasons explain why the monetary

authorities of countries hold international reserves.
for precautionary and for transactional motives.

These are

As a precau

tionary motive, reserves are held to insure the finance of tem
porary balance-of-payments deficits.

This strategy allows more

flexibility in making adjustments, as well as more independent
domestic policies.

The second reason or transaction motive stems

from the fact that some means must exist and be recognized os
acceptable payment for international transactions.

In the pogt-

World War II period, the dollar increasingly became a most

2

Tobin, National Econom ie Policy, p. 1H7.

8

acceptable international currency as a result of the transaction
motive.
Among the reasons for this transformation of the dollar
into international currency were the benefits of interest which
the dollar could earn; the products and services which the dollar
commanded; and, the convenience of acceptability and convert
ibility in both foreign exchange markets and the United States
Treasury.

Moreover, this transformation was attributable to an

uncompetitive and prostrate European market looking to America
for products and services, and having the implicit understanding
that accumulated dollars could be converted into gold upon de
mand.
How, then, did uncompetitive Western Europe again become
competitive and, subsequently, manage to accumulate dollars?
Since economic recovery prefigured competitiveness, the means of
that recovery becomes significant.

That means was provided by

the United States in the form of direct assistance.

From 19M-6 to

1958, $80 billion was made available to Western Europe, twothirds of which was expended for economic recovery and one-third
for defense purposes.'1
While some loss in the relative international economic
position of the United States realistically must have been

-^Robert II. Heller, "The Transactions Demand for inter
national Means of Payment,” The Journal of Political Economy,
LXXVI (January/Fcbruary, 1908), IMS.
*Seymour E. Harris, ed., The Dollar in Ur is is (New York:
Hnreourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1901), p . 0.

0

expected with the recovery of Western Europe and Japan, the con
tinued monetary difficulties and implications arising therefrom
seem not to have been anticipated.

Rather, these difficulties

have evoked responses ranging from alarm to dismay.

The general

concern at the national level has centered around the idea that
continued deficits allow increasingly heavy claims against the
American economy.

Since these claims link domestic policy deci

sions to balance-of-payments considerations and, thereby, limit
independence and freedom of action, the conclusion reached is
that these deficits not only should not but cannot continue.
The underlying fear accompanying this conclusion is that should
claims be withdrawn, serious complications would arise which
could undermine the entire foreign policy program as well as
America's international economic position.-’
In conjunction with these considerations, steady pro
gress and sustained full employment at the domestic level have
become and remain an equally perplexing concern.

The very exis

tence of the deficit is capable of and may serve to encourage
the advocation of and adherence to a stringently conservative
domestic policy.

As justification for the elimination of the

deficit, in the extreme, policies resulting in a state of semi
depression could conceivably he proposed and applied.

While

such policies might be acceptable to some, including those

’John Kenneth Galbraith, "Some Thoughts on Public Policy
and the Dollar Problem," in The Dollar in Crisis, ed. by Seymour
E. Harris (New York: harcourt, brace and World, Inc., IDOL),
p. 00.

in

holders of liquid assets throughout the world, the feasibility
and acquiescence on the national level is highly questionable and
certainly politically controversial, as well as detrimental.
On the other hand, some domestic policies, notably those
which have acceded to and, in some cases, accelerated inflation,
have certainly had an adverse effect on the balance-of-payments
status.

This is particularly applicable to the competitive

position of American products in the world market.

Domestic

inflation which raises prices necessarily lowers competitiveness
abroad, unless a comparable degree of inflation exists abroad.
Therefore, it has become increasingly difficult, if not impos
sible, to consider domestic economic policies as separate and
divorced from foreign economic policies.

Instead, both must be

considered in the broader context of the American payments and
gold reserves situation.

In this broader context, any viable

and enduring solution, or partial solution, to the balance-ofpayments problem would necessitate cooperation and coordination,
or nationalization of policy in the broadest sense:
ically, politically/diplomatically, and militarily.

econom

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

For the two areas of international trade and foreign
economic assistance, the balance-of-payments problem has partic
ular political significance.

This significance is derived from

the fact that the downward trend in the unique, yet temporary,
American trade position began almost as soon as Western European
recovery materialized.

This recovery coincided with the upward

trend in foreign aid expenditures.

Therefore, Western Europe’s

recovery, as it became a virtual certainty, caused the superi
ority of the United States inevitably to diminish, and the eco
nomic gap between the two areas was quickly being closed.
Tangible evidence of the closing gap appeared first in
the reversal of capital movements.

As this reversal increasingly

favored Western Europe 5 a. fearful reaction was elicited in the
United States, accompanied by numerous warnings about gold losses
and loss of confidence in the dollar.

As a result, growing

opposition to expansionary domestic policies appeared.

Another

concern repeatedly voiced was that America was pricing itself
out of the world markets because of domestic inflation.
As a further complication, American inflation was being
confronted by the rapid economic growth of Western Europe and
Japan.

These countries were said to be exercising and being
11
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stimulated by sound, orthodox financial practices."*"

In other

words, inflation in those countries was restrained by government
planning and policy, which thereby improved the individual
country’s overall competitiveness.
In contrast, alternative means were sought in the United
States.

While a more equitable distribution of gold reserves

was desired internationally, the continued drain in the postWorld War II period was considered highly undesirable, and a
solution to curtail it was avidly sought.

One alternative means

of offsetting a reversal in capital movements would require the
United States to increase substantially the material exported
over that imported.

Successful accomplishment, however, would

be presupposed by a favorably competitive trade position, which,
in turn, would relate to price, thus completing the circle and
returning to the domestic inflation issue.
An example of this cycle would be the case of the Amer
ican steel industry.

With the wage-price syndrome in the steel

industry, American prices are said to have become uncompetitive
and, hence, markets have been lost both abroad and at home.

2

Secondary effects would include the weakening of the position of
other products, thereby multiplying the problems of the dollar
dilemma.

■^Gottfried Uabcrlcr, "Domestic Economic Policies and the
United States Balance of Payments," in The Dollar in Crisis, cd.
by Seymour E. Harris (New York: Ilarcourt, Brace and World, Inc.,
1961), p. 71.
^John Kenneth Galbraith, "Some Thoughts ori Public Policy
and the Dollar Problem," in Harris, The Dollar in Crisis, p. 90.
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Conversely, the United States steel industry justifies
cost increase on the very grounds of insuring the competitive
trade position of the United States.

The industry asserts that

machinery and equipment provide the means by which competition,
the base of the United States trade position, is maintained.
Therefore, this machinery and equipment must be continually
modernized, which consequently necessitates continuous expense.
Table I reflects the steady increase resulting from this practice.

TABLE 1
BUSINESS EXPENDITURES FOR NEW PLANT AND EQUIPMENT
CALENDAR YEARS 1945-1968, INCLUSIVE
(Millions)
Year
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
3952
1953
3954
1955
1956

.............
........... .
.............
.............
.............
............ .
.............
..............
.............
.............
.............
.............

Source:

Total

Year

$ 8,69 2
14'848
20*612
22* 059
19'285
20'605
25'644
26'493
28'322
26'827
28'701
35'081

1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
3966
1967
1968

Total
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............

$36,962
30'526
32*543
35'680
34*370
37 *310
39'220
44,900
51*960
60*630
61*660
65*230

Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics
and Securities Exchange Commission, Facts and Figures
on Government Finance (New York: Tax Foundation,
Inc., 1969), p. 49.

This modernization expense is, in turn, passed on to the
market through absorption in the sale price of the final pro
duct.

Attempts to modify this practice through the reduction or

14

stabilization of prices have resulted in the outcry that "no
sales will be made, no work /will be/ provided, no taxes /will
be mode/ available, and /the/ international competitive position,
/the/ balance-of -payments, /the/ gold reserves, and /the./ na
tional growth /of the United States/ will seriously suffer."^
While these claims represent the extreme position, the rationale
behind retaining this practice was said to have been given cre
dence and support in earlier statements by Secretary of the
Treasury Douglas Dillon, speaking before the American Bankers
Association.

He is quoted as saying

More rapid equipment modernization by industry is vital
to the success of our efforts to remain competitive in world
markets and to achieve the rate of growth needed to assure
us prosperity and reasonably full employment.1^
While the significance of modernization may be and seemingly is
crucial to our competitiveness, it does not seem to follow nec
essarily that prices should be increased.

Rather, Mr. Dillon

intended that emphasis should be placed on devoting a larger
percentage of our gross national product to this task without
contributing to the wage-price spiral.
While the conflict of opinion over inflation has by no
means been resolved, the steel industry serves as one illustra
tion of the interaction between, and the inseparability of,
foreign and domestic policy in the balance-of-payments problem.

%oger Blaugh, "Defense of the Steel Price Increase," in
Problems of the Modern Economy, ed. by Edmund S. Phelps (New
York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1DGG) , p. 46.
111b id
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The question, then, becomes, how competitive is the United
States?

To what degree has the country’s position declined in

ternationally?

Since this subject has been frequently debated

and conflicting reports offered, it should be pointed out that
any conclusion does seem to rest on the particular time selected
for study.
One study in this area has concluded, on the basis of a
comparison between over 200 consumer goods representing 2,MOO
product brands, excluding automobiles, that for the period 1950
through 196b, the ’’competitiveness of American consumer goods
/in the domestic market/ deteriorated during the 1950’s but
stabilized after 1960.

In foreign markets, however, our position

has sharply deteriorated since 1960.”^

Other factors were con

sidered which also enter into such a comparison, such as quality,
tariffs, and transportation costs.
In spite of this sharp deterioration, however, there ap
pears to be the possibility of increased demand for consumer
goods.

This study also found that the countries of Western

Europe, and especially those belonging to the Common Market,
appear to be bordering upon a consumer goods boom reminiscent of
that which occurred in the United States in the early postwar
period and lasted through the 1950’s.^

Such a boom, again,

-’John J. Arena, ” Is the United States Pricing Itself
Out of World Markets?” , in The Dollar Dol'ici!: Cause's and Curt’s ,
ed. by II. Peter Gray (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1967), p. M7.
(lIbid. , p. MS.
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would profit the United States only if its products were compet
itive price-wise, while simultaneously offering higher quality
and better innovation.

Such assets, however, have been of more

benefit in selling such products as specialized machinery, new
chemical products and aircraft equipment.
count in large part for our trade surplus.''

These products ac
Consumer products,

therefore, appear to have been less competitive for a number of
years, but could possibly increase significantly in the future.
While it can be argued that America’s overall competi
tive position is basically strong, perhaps the relevant question
is whether this position is strong enough.

In 196b, exports of

goods and services totaled $36.5 billion, reaching a summit for
O
this country and all others as well.
Concurrently, imports
paralleled the rise in gross national product.

By United States

Treasury definition, however, the commercial surplus has grown
from $3.7 billion in 1960 to $5.9 billion in 196b.^

These fig

ures, then, do not depict America’s competitive position as
either weak or deteriorating.

Instead, they might be inter

preted as confirmation that prices and underlying prices, i.e.,
costs, have been unquestionably competitive as demonstrated by

^John J. Arena, "Is the United States Pricing Itself Out
of World Markets?," in Gray, The Dollar Deficit: Causes and
Cures, p. 52.
O
Richard N. Cooper, "The United States Competitive
Position— A .1965 Appraisal,” in The Dollar Def icit: Causes and
Cures, ed. by II. Peter Gray (Boston: U. C. Heath and Co., 1967),
p. 37.
^ l h i d , p.

37.
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Americans excellent performance.

Moreover, while inflation has

been a. problem in the United States, it certainly has plagued
foreign countries as well.

Furthermore, inflation will most

likely continue to confront the economics of other industrial
nations in the future.
Despite seemingly we11-documented assertions that Amer
ica’s trade position is sound and its relative competitiveness
strong, the harassing question is whether it is strong enough to
meet the country’s widespread financial commitments abroad.
Such ability necessitates that exports exceed imports to the
degree that a surplus large enough to cover foreign commitments
is provided.

If meeting these commitments results in a continued

deficit, the question appears to hinge upon the depth of the
deficit, or
how large a deficit in its overall balance-of-payments the
United States can or should run to provide the necessary
liquidity for growth in world trade, without at the same
time jeopardizing the international exchange standard.-^
Therefore, maintaining or increasing the export surplus would
involve several goals, some of which might come into conflict,
but all of ' iiich would fundamentally relate to the continuation
of international financial assistance.
Beyond national concern, there also exists the contin
uing concern of other industrial and underdeveloped countries
regarding the export surplus of the United States.

In

^Richard N. Cooper, ’’The United States Competitive
Posit:ion--A 1005 Appraisal," In Cray, The Dollar lie Pic it:
Causes and Cures, p. Dl.
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comparison to many of them, America, with the realization of a.
significant export surplus, is in a weak position to argue that
it needs an increase the most.

Moreover, the United States may

be confronted by the resistance and resentment of other nations.
Their reactions could take the form of countermeasures to im
prove their own exports comparable to American efforts, lack of
cooperation in reducing the existing trade barriers, and possibly
even the application of new trade barriers.

In short, equilib

rium or even limitation of the American balance-of-payments de
ficit is confronted by complex, overlapping considerations in
both areas.
Similar to the balance-of-payments problem is the interrelationship between trade and aid, which also is a recent
phenomenon.

It is additionally complicated by America’s lack of

experience in foreign aid.

The shambles of World War II elevatec

the United States not only to a position of leadership in inter
national trade, but also in Western defense.

In this new role,

America changed places with Western Europe and assumed the re
sponsibilities for both foreign economic and defense aid.

At

the close of the war, the United States became the protector of
Western Europe rather than being implicitly under the protection
of Western Europe.

The general situation which has resulted was

summed up in a. policy statement by President John F. Kennedy in
1961:
The surplus of our exports over our imports, while
substantial, has not been large enough to cover our

19

expenditures for U.S. military establishments abroad, for
capital invested abroad by private American businesses., and
for government economic assistance and loan programs.^
The over-expanded expenditures, then, have developed not only
from Government assistance and defense programs, but also from
private investment.
Since the close of the war, government expenditures and
private investment, though reduced, have continued despite the
fact that Western Europe and Japan are considered recovered.
These expenses, plus the flow of capital away from the United
States have adversely affected the balance-of-payments situation.
These expenses, however, have not been limited to Western Europe
and Japan.

Rather, a splintering effect has taken place which

now encompasses a sizeable number of countries throughout the
world.

The explanation of this development has been that Amer

ica, while nursing Western Europe back to economic health,
shouldered the former security responsibilities of Western
Europe throughout the world.

Considering the complications and

difficulties inherent in these responsibilities, in addition to
the expense, it has not been surprising that Western Europe be
came extremely reluctant to undertake any further involvement as
long as the United States was adequately meeting the task.
During this time, the trend was moving away from coloi
nialism and progressed through the breakdown of empire to the
emergence of numerous free but underdeveloped countries.

These

lipresident John F. Kennedy, quoted in Harris, The Dollar
in Crisis, p. 13.
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new countries, as well as many old ones, have become of much
strategic importance in the post-World War II era.

Their im

portance has primarily been as pawns in the Cold War efforts of
both East and West and as a. means of carrying out the American
foreign policy of the time, to contain Communism.

The United

States, then, has been faced with the difficulty and expense of
waging the Cold War in all its aspects, political, economic,
diplomatic, and military, and, at the same time, the individual
and increasingly persistent aspirations of the newly independent
nations for rapid economic development.
In accepting these responsibilities, whether they be in
terpreted as challenges or as burdens, the United States became
an international power with national pride and prestige tied to
its policies.

Western Europe, in contrast, declined in inter

national influence both economically and militarily.

Perhaps

much more significantly, however, is Western Europe’s achieve
ment of a remarkable economic recovery and the continuation of
sustained growth without the heavy burden of defense.

Western

Europe, therefore, relinquished international economic involve
ment for the sake of domestic economic progress; in other words,
Western Europe has unprotest.ingly allowed the United States to
assume its former international military role and., thereby, has
concentrated its total effort in one area.

The result lias been

the ,Tmost remarkable economic progress within Europe since
before 1913.

Consequently, Western Europe has prospered

•|O
Tobin, National Economic Policy, p. 77.
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financially tit the national level at the expense of international
prestige and leadership.
Not only has the progress been remarkable within Western
Europe, but also in relation to that of the United States.

Since

1950, certain Western European economies have grown proportion
ately faster than that of the United States in both productivity
"I O

and gross national product.

While this growth itself offers

no direct threat to the United States’ economy, its effect has
been to strengthen the Western European competitive position in
world markets.

At the same time, Western European economies

have been attempting to move toward continental unity.

Combina

tion of these two developments could lead to a further reduction
in the competitive position of the United States in foreign and
domestic markets.
While Europe has been concentrating on internal growth,
unhampered by large external security expenses, the United States
has been spending large sums of money for overseas commitments.
This situation, from an American point of view, might be inter
preted as the ’’economic consequence of the passing of an age of
free security, /for the defenses now available are, at best,
uncertain, and/ unlike the natural barriers that once protected
—
—
] i|
/the United States/ very, very expensive."
Not only has the
United States lost the possibility of choosing between interna
ls

Tobin, National Economic Pol icy, p . 77.
p. 7 2 .
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tional involvement and isolation, but also the security of geo
graphic isolation or inaccessibility.

Material vulnerability

therefore, has become a very real concern in both a physical and
financial sense.
Initially, however, this vulnerability was obscure and
seemingly remote.

In the period following World War II, however,

these expensive security appropriations made under the Marshall
Plan, as well as those made in the early 1950Ts were spent by the
recipients in the world market.

The United States at that time

was the primary and, in many cases, the only source for needed
products.

It was not until the 1950Ts that the situation changed

as Western Europe became more competitive.

As more aid dollars

were consequently spent outside the United States, these even
tually came into the possession of Western European central
bankers who could and sometimes did exchange them for gold
through the United States Treasury.

At the same time, the trade

lost by the United States further weakened its overall compet
itiveness .
In short, new defense responsibilities and their con
current expenses created a military situation which undermined
the strength of the United States financially.

Furthermore,

this weakened condition occurred concomitant to Europe’s vigor
ous recovery and increasing strength.

What this meant on the

national level was the the United States could no longer bo
considered the world banker and, in effect, the country had conic
of age in the sense that it was now experiencing problems,
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frustrations, and burdens similar to those other nations had long
endured.

These two reversals, then, the flow of capital in favor

of Western Europe and the assumed role of defender, have ulti
mately resulted in Western Europe’s refusal to continue ac
cepting without question and without participation in the inter
national leadership adopted by the United States in the postWorld War II era.

Essentially, therefore, a process of equaliza

tion has taken place.
With the development of these two trends in the 1950’s
and their continuation throughout the 1960’s, economic policy
determination has presented an intricate, complex, and perplexing
problem for national policy-makers.

While the economic recovery

of Western Europe and Japan after World War II was considered
highly desirable and in the national interest of the United
States, correction to some extent of the United States’ economic
position today has been favored by a. majority of American econo
mists.

This contemporary concern over the national debt, how

ever, contrasts sharply with earlier attitudes.

Previously,

throughout most of the postwar years, and even through the 1950’s,
a deficit account was not disparaged.

On the contrary, the "de

ficit balance in the United States international accounts was
regarded as a. desirable condition and U.S. economic foreign
policy was framed with the intent to continue the deficit.”

I^

John 0. Hogan, The U.S. balance of Payments and Capital
flows (New York: frcdcr.ick A. Prauger, Publishers, 1967), p. 90.

\
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In the decade of the 1960's, however, the current of thinking has
ebbed in relation to continuing the deficit.
Several factors helped to bring about a change of opinion.
Among these were the emergence of the European Common Market, the
restraint on fiscal and monetary policy and, significantly,
"pride, the symbolism of gold, and confusion about the basic
causes of the deficit."

16

Just as surprise was registered at

Western Europe’s remarkable recovery, so too was the alteration
in the international economic position of the United States un
expected.

This shift was comprehended in 1960 when a run on

gold occurred.

Coinciding with this incident was a period of

domestic regression and bothersome unemployment.

In 1958, the

rate of unemployment was 6.8 percent and until 1963, hovered
around 5.5 percent.

Consequently, the balance-of-payments

deficit as well as unemployment became political issues in the
1960 campaign.
At the beginning of the decade of the 1960’s, when the
Kennedy Administration took office, the enunciated economic ob
jective was growth with the least possible amount of inflation.
This objective was threatened by the balance of payments which
the President believed to be responsible for restrained expansionist policies.

18

To release restraint on the domestic economy

^ ’iJohn D. Hogan, The U.S. Balance of Payments and Capital
Plows, j). 90.
17 Ibid., p. 91.
.18

York:

' Seymour E. Harris, Economics of P]if Kennedy Years (New
Harper and Row, ]*ub I.ishers, 1964), p. 148.
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would result in growth, but it would also fan inflation with fur
ther deterioration of the balance of payments.

The question,

therefore, remains how to reconcile domestic and foreign economic
policy in order that the goals of both might be met.

As a re

sult, arguments have emerged which support an expansionist do
mestic policy as the best answer for dollar protection.

Such a

policy would not only insure American growth but, incidentally,
would solve the deficit problem.

This policy, "with large

creations of money and federal deficits, /promises to/ bring
prosperity and inflows of capital, a reduction of outflows of
capital, and even lower costs and, hence, induce an improved
19
competitive position."
The balance-of-payments problem,
handled as an adjunct to domestic policy, would become synonymous
with expansion rather than restriction and, therefore, not in
conflict with domestic policy.
This economic policy objective of growth with minimum
inflation has been continued throughout the 1960Ts, and, at the
same time, attempts have been made to achieve a favorable bal
ance of payments by increasing exports, decreasing imports, and
keeping costs low.

Such an effort, however, is contradictory in

that a relative rise in incomes resulting from internal growth
corresponds to an increase in imports and a decrease in exports.
To export more within this framework implies a domestic policy
which controls inflation and, thereby, involves the whole
political/economic spectrum.
19

Harris, Economics of the Kennedy Years, p. 197.
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Diametrically opposed to this conclusion is the Western
European experience "where growth twice as large as /in the
United States/ seemed compatible with a. large favorable balance
of payments.

Although a number of factors were working

against this improved position in Western Europe, (e.g., less
discrimination against American goods and Public Law 480),
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‘ it

has persisted and the balance-of-payments position of the United
pp

States has deteriorated. cUnder these conditions, strong advocates of wage and
price policy have emerged.

To make the United States

more competitive and restore equilibrium, anti-inflationary
domestic policies become fundamental to this view.

One repre

sentative of such a viewpoint suggests disinflation which, in
contrast to deflation, would prevent or avoid inflation without
augmenting the ranks of the u n e m p l o y e d . D i s m i s s i n g exchangerate alterations, exchange control and deflation as undesirable
methods, money wages in deficit countri.es would rise somewhat
slower than productivity in order that prices might decline,
while in surplus countries, the rise in wages should at least

^Harris, Economics of the Kennedy Years, p. 149.
^Public Law '180 is the more common designation for
Title I of the Agricultural Trade, Development and Assistance
Act of 1984 and allows for surplus agricultural commodities to
be exported under subsidy conditions.
H arr is , T1io 1)o11 ar in Cr1s is , p . 7 .
2-^Cottfr.ied llnberlor, "Domestic Economic Policies and
the United States Balance of Payments," in Harris, The Dollar in
Cr tsis, p . 67.
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be comparable to that of productivity.

This proposal would not,

therefore, require a reduction of wages but an acceptance of
discipline.

ON

The alternative, barring intentional inflation in

surplus countries or a significant, unforeseen growth in demand
internationally, would be exchange rate modification.
In conflict with this new point are the economic condi
tions in West Germany.

Indeed, those conditions seem to refute

this argument, for wages there have risen more than in the
United States during the period from 1955 to I960; yet, this
rise did not appear in West Germany's relative inflation.

The

explanation offered is that significant increases in output af
fecting productivity offset the wage rise.^
Another approach toward improving the trade position of
the United States vis-'h-vis other countries is devaluation of
the dollar.

This recommendation rests on the assumption that the

dollar is indisputably overvalued and has been for quite some
time in relation to Western Exiropean currencies.

Furthermore,

this overvaluation is
implicit almost tautologically, in the fact that the country
has been unable to achieve a satisfactory balance of pay
ments, in spite of maintaining a higher level of unemployment
than generally considered desirable and in spite of the

^'Gottfried Uaberler, "Domestic Economic Policies and
the United States Balance of Payments,” in Harris, The Dollar
in Crisis, p. 72.
^\Sir Roy Harrod, "The Dollar Problem and the Gold
Question," in The Dollar in Crisis, eel. by Seymour E. Harris
(New York: Hareourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1901), p. 5*1.
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buttressing of the balance of payments by a variety of spe
cial measures designed to increase foreign-exchange receipts
on both current and capital account beyond, what would have
resulted from normal commercial transactions.^
For these reasons as well as by statistical analyses involving
relative purchasing power, relative unit costs of production,
and econometric analysis of the exchange rate, the conclusion
reached is that current dollar overvaluation is between 15 and
25 percent. ^

Following this argument to its conclusion, over

valuation has caused an unnecessarily high unemployment rate
coupled with an unsolvable balance-of-payments problem, thereby
posing the ’’classic policy conflict between the requirements of
external and internal stability."

This conflict would be

further aggravated by contiguous circumstances, e.g., business
investments abroad and, consequently, export of technological
innovation, thereby further supplementing the competitive
strength of Western Europe.
Devaluation of the dollar, however, would be a radical
departure from the past economic policies of the United States,
and appears to have no general and strong support at this time.
Therefore, an alternative solution has been sought, which has
attempted to originate and combine policies working toward both

2(,Harry G. Johnson, "An Overview of Price Levels, Employ
ment, and the Balance of Payments,” in The Dollar Deficit:
Causes and Cures, ed. by H. Peter Cray (Boston: D. C. Death and
Co., ll
J(>7) , p. 91.
^Tbid, p. 91.
p. 98.
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internal and external stability, permitting expansionary domestic
policies, while not adversely affecting the balance of payments.
One such related policy would involve reducing the out
flow of United States capital, thereby reducing payments.

While

this would appear to be somewhat of a shift in emphasis from re
ceipts to payments, it would indirectly affect exports.
Although the goal of increased exports has been consis
tent and explicit, one of the chronic difficulties in dealing
with the balance-of-payments problem has been the virtual im
possibility of isolating a. specific cause or causes.

To illus

trate the magnitude of this difficulty, in I960, the United
States recorded $33 billion in payments and transfers and $29
billion in receipts.^

While the balance-of-payments deficit

lias stubbornly persisted, totaling $20 billion for the period
19S0 to 1960, it is equally remarkable that West Germany, Italy,
and Japan, "three countries with an aggregate GNP less than onefourth of that of the United States, could absorb a balance-ofon
payments surplus nearly equal to the U.S. deficit."
To pin
point certain factors in this web of international transactions
offers little hope for fully untangling it.

Such a description

suggests the complexity of the problem and denies a single
solution.

^Edward M. Bernstein, "The New Administration and the
Dollar-Payments Problem," in '1'bc Dollar in Crisis, ed. by Seymour
E. Harris (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961),
p. 81.
30

Ibid.

p . 75.
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Given this complexity of international transactions and
their effect upon the balance of payments, it would not seem,
therefore, that isolation or concentration upon only a certain
few factors would achieve the desired solution.

Rather, con

centrating upon the interaction of several factors has been ex
perimented with recently.

One attempt has involved adopting and

implementing domestic policy which reduces the outflow of gold.
This outflow has been especially noticeable in foreign invest
ments, and appears to be in response to some financial incentive.
The result of foreign investment and the establishment of sub
sidies and licensees has been to diminish United States techno
logical superiority.

Accompanying the investment of funds was

the export of technique, and thus the most modern machines,
skills, and production methods were transferred to plants of
foreign countries which frequently were constructed by United
*3I
States dollars.
In addition to a loss in technological superiority, the
United States also lost markets due to the policies of foreign
governments.

Since American companies which sold to European

markets were paid in national inconvertible currencies, these
companies began buying products in the European market which
were previously purchased in the United States.

Consequently,

American buyers, because they demanded more quality and effi
ciency, trained Europeans to meet their requirements.*
.
S

31
Irving li. Kravis, "The U.H. Trade Position and the
Common Market," in Problems ol' the Modern Economy, ed. by Edmund
S. Phelps (New York: W. W„ Norton and Co., Inc., 3000), p. 336.
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Furthermore, economic reasons, e.g., higher profit mar
gins, tax advantages, low labor costs, closer proximity to the
market, as well as a means of overcoming tariff barriers, ex
change controls, and Government purchasing policies, have moti
vated the establishment and expansion of brandies, subsidiaries,
on
and licensees in Western Europe and e l s e w h e r e T h e overall
effect of these foreign affiliates on the domestic economy has
not been clearly established.

In fact, the question as to

whether incentives for foreign investment actually exist has not
yet been resolved.
Despite the questions surrounding the actual existence of
tax incentives, however, the advantages afforded to the coun
tries which import United States technology is readily apparent.
Indeed, the advanced stage of American Research and Development
activities has been said to
"explain” competitive trade success in manufacturing in
dustries considerably better than any other variable tested.
This finding is consistent with a view that the world eco
nomic role of the United States involves the systematic
export of new products.^
In this study, the conclusion is drawn that a definite and strong
relationship does exist between the concentration upon Research
and Development by American industries and the export value of

■^Irving B. Kravis, "The U.S. Trade Position and the
Common Market,” in Phelps, Problems of the Modern Economy,
p. 358.
^Donald U. Koesing, "Impact of RED on U.S. Trade," The
Journal of Political Economy, LXXV (February, 19G7) , '15.
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their products.

Moreover, those industries actively engaged in

Research and Development display economies of scale and highlevel skill requirements in their production, and, significantly,
"capital requirements are inversely associated with R&D.

^

Western European countries, therefore, benefit doubly by the im
port of American technology.

Not only do they improve their own

competitive trade position, but they also manage to avoid the
expense of technological innovation.
From the evidence available, it seems more probable that
the broad effect of overseas affiliates is adverse.

As a result,

the argument has been put forth that tax policy should afford no
special privileges to foreign i n v e s t m e n t . F o l l o w i n g this
argument, the United States should not encourage further aggra
vation to the national deficit by providing an incentive in the
form of tax policy.

This would appear to be a matter of self-

interest.
An extension of this argument would require a revision of
laws to place American corporations which operate through sub
sidiaries on the same level as those which operate through
branches, or in the some category with domestic corporations.

'^Keesing, "Impact of R&D on U.S. Trade," p. *15.
J)^]b id . p. MS.
^Irving B . Kravis, "The U.S. Trade Position and the
Common Market,” in Phelps, Problems of the Modern Economy,
p. 358.
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In other words, tax revision would require payment of full taxes
on corporation income whether distributed or not.

The rationale

behind such a proposal is that the time of international dollar
shortage is past.

No longer does the United States need to be

concerned with stimulating the economies of Western Europe.

In

stead of allowing and, indeed, encouraging the flow of capital
from this country by means of subsidiaries, which both strengthen
the competitive trade position of Western Europe and cause do
mestic problems to become more frustrating, the United States
should instead contemporize its policies to synchronize with the
dollar glut situation. ^
The question arises, next, of the extent to which these
capital exports contribute to the United States balance-ofpayments deficit.

The contribution appears to be sizable.

Of

annual deficits amounting to between $3 and $*+ billion, United
States capital exports accounted for $2,884 million in 1958;
OO
$2,301 million in 1959, and $3,,ll40 million in 1960.
Further
more, additional exports of capital to underdeveloped countries
are keenly sought, and one means of providing this increase is
by deflecting capital exports away from countries already highly
developed.
In addition to large capital exports made possible by
such seemingly antiquated tax laws, sizable outflows of capital

•’^Harris, The Dollar in Crisis, p. 23.
~^lb id, p. 21.
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have occurred under monetary policy which established low interest
rates on short-term loans.

For the period from 1958 through 1960,

"the United States lost $11 billion in gold and accumulation of
■3q
short-term dollar debt to foreign countries.” 3 In attempting to
control these short-term outflows, national and international
goals again overlap and conflict.

A further complication is that

the method of reconciliation depends upon the political party in
office at the time.
In general, the two parties are distinguishable by their
traditional monetary policies.

The Democrats are said to be the

party of easy money and the Republicans the opposite.

Essen

tially, this means that the Democrats generally favor monetary
expansion or reduced interest rates to ease the burden of debt
and expand credit and output, whereas the Republican ideology
has been influenced by the
Puritans with their emphasis on saving and the classical
economists with their insistence either that money makes
no difference to the level of output and employment or
that an expansion of money merely brings a corresponding
rise of prices.^
The effects of these political attitudes influence both domestic
and foreign policy.
In the concern over a balanced international budget, and
with political attention focused on domestic inflation, full
employment has been affected, and the reverse is also true.

(Now York:

Seymour E. Harris, The Economics of the Political Parties
The Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 330.

l|0Ibid. , p. 100.
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The intricacies of this problem are seen by an economic overview
of the 1950Ts.

In summary of this period,

The tightening of credit, which in early .1953 was undertaken
as an anti-inflationary measure, had something to do with the
business downturn in the summer of that year. The easing of
credit in 1954, which helped to promote recovery, was a
factor bringing about the resumption of inflation early in
1956. Delay in relaxing credit curbs in 1957, which was
widely criticized, was attributable largely to a determina
tion on the part of the System to avoid the excessive ease
of 1954. Tightening of credit in the third quarter of 1958
may have slowed down the pace of the recovery at that time
getting under way. It is apparent that the path between the
objectives of full employment and price stability is narrow
and difficult.^
Circumscribing the whole issue has been the strong political in
fluence of labor.

The conflict which exists over interest rates

and inflation, therefore, involves not only full employment and
price stability, but more broadly, fiscal in opposition to mone
tary policy, and domestic challenging international economic
policy.
Since this interlocking economic relationship between
domestic and international policy exists, it has prompted policy
recommendations on the international level as well as the do
mestic to improve the United States trade position.

One signifi

cant proposal has reference to United States trade relations
with Communist countries, especially the Union of Soviet Social
ist Republics (USSR).

The predominant attitude toward such

trade has, in the past, been extremely negative.

A number of

factors, political and economic, sparked this response.

41

Ralph U. Freeman cd., Postwar Foonom Ie Trends in the
arper and brothers, I960), p. 87.
Uni.tod States (Nc;w York:
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Politically, United States goals have sought to restrict and iso
late Communism, or contain it.

To accomplish this goal, con

sidered essential to national security, the United States at
tempted to create solidarity among the Western bloc of nations.
Unfortunately, such solidarity was much more in evidence
in the immediate postwar period than it is currently.

Since the

early 1950Ts, a crumbling process has broken up the political,
military, and economic ties, both in the areas of cooperation and
coordination.

Evidence of this is seen in the wane of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, the impotence of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and, finally, the
gradual termination of informal political relationships allowing
for informal coordination.

In reality, therefore, the concept of

solidarity has not been conspicuously demonstrable or defendable.
In addition, the assistance furnished by the United States
in establishing the European Economic Community has perhaps fur
ther segmented Western Europe.

In any case, the coagulation of

the six nations involved, coupled with considerable gains in
Western European productivity have served to segment and regroup
the Western countries.

With this economic regrouping, the other

wise separate and relatively powerless countries have secured a
more favorable trade position, especially in confronting the
United States.
Based upon these circumstances, it would seem that im
provement of the United States balancc-of-payments problem by
substantially increasing exports over imports would have serious
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complications.

These complications rest on the assumption that

it would be unlikely that either the European Economic Community
or the other trade bloc, the European Free Trade Association,
would agree to lower tariffs without a similar commitment by the
United States.

Under the GATT agreement, these organizations

are required only to "fix their outside tariffs at a level which
maintains the same general incidence of protection as prevailed
before the common market was developed."

Under these circum

stances, the Western European trade blocs are in a position to
expect and perhaps command reciprocity.

Unfortunately, such

reciprocity would be no simple matter for the United States be
cause of legal entanglements and restrictions on presidential
power.
While the Trade Agreements Act of 1939 empowered the
President to reduce tariffs up to 50 percent in the conclusion
of trade agreements, subsequent stipulations have reduced the
original authorization to the point of all but superseding it.

hQ

In essence, these qualifications which have evolved have been
intended to protect American industry from serious injury from
imports.

Definition of serious injury has become so expanded

and'all-inclusive, however, that the intention of the Act, i.e.,
to encourage innovation and adjustment, has not materialized.
H2
Raymond Vernon, "Solutions: Trade Policy," in The
Dollar in Crisis, ed. by Seymour E. Harris (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, Inc., 1961), p. 210.
113Ibid, p. 210.
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Instead, the opposite effect has been produced and the need for
adjustment by labor and industry has been minimized.1'1*
Short of a fundamental change to this domestic concept of
injury, as well as a revamping of legislation, the President can
hardly undertake meaningful negotiations to reduce tariff bar
riers with any of the European trade blocs.

At the same time,

the possibility of implementing protectionist policies with the
intention of shifting the national deficit to other countries
seems unrealistic.

Such attempts would be strongly discouraged

by the contemporary fact that retaliatory action could realisti
cally be expected.
Between the polarity of reciprocity demanded for tariff
reduction and retaliation, which would most likely be imposed
for the adoption of protectionist measures, is seen the tension
between domestic and international politics.

Not only do do

mestic interests have the benefits of lobbyists, the backing of
Congressmen, and the appeal of nationalism, but they have a long
line of historical and legal precedents.

Assuming that these

barriers to liberalized trade practices will not be eliminated
in the immediate future, the possibility of establishing new
trade relations has appeared tantalizing.
Although it has been only recently that such a proposal
would be seriously heard in the United States, nevertheless, an
opportunity for trade with the Soviet bloc gradually held some

''''Raymond Vernon, "Solut ions:
The Dollar in Crisis, p. 211.

Trade Policy," in Harris,
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interest.

It has been only in the postwar era, however, that the

Soviet bloc has been recognized as a full-fledged member of the
world trade circle.

One of the hindrances to full trade partici

pation in world markets up to that time had been the Soviet
blocTs "almost pathological . . . insistence on balancing income
with outgo in such t r a d e . T h i s has been carried to the point
of even disregarding convertible currencies and insisting on
bilateral balancing.

Such a policy has been attributed primarily

to a cultural lag which may possibly be overcome.
Indeed, it has been proposed that a parallel exists be
tween the Soviet blocTs attitude toward comparative advantage
and multilateralism, and
just as the Soviet bloc discovered the concept of comparative
advantage in 1953 or 1959, so we may anticipate that it will
shortly discover the mechanism of multilateral clearing and
will invent its own version of currency convertibility. b
Furthermore, indications are that the Soviet bloc desires more
trade with outside countries, although it is hard to conceive
that the Soviet bloc would allow itself to become dependent on
foreign trade any more than the United States has.

The remaining

essential ingredient is a mutual desire on the part of external
countries to establish trade relations with the Soviets.

There

does, therefore, exist, even though remotely, the possibility of
a new economic relationship between the Soviet bloc countries
and the rest of the world.

11'’Raymond Vernon, "Solutions:
The Dollar in Crisis, p . 219„
l|6Ibid, p. 219.
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On the other hand, the possibility of increased trade
relations with the Soviet bloc would also entail the risk of ad
versely affecting the balance of payments.

The thesis and

antithesis of the problem posed are as follows:
1.

the specter of a heavy trader in the free world’s
markets, armed with the control devices necessary for
earning foreign exchange, and capable of arbitrarily
manipulating these foreign exchange earnings, and

2.

the alternative, equally unappealing, to continue the
practice of bilateral balancing and through a web
of bilateral controls to inhibit the specter.

There is a third choice of a more moderate nature and more
tolerable to United States desires than either of the two pre
ceding.

Such a choice might involve collaboration among the

free world nations aimed toward reaching an agreement which
would combine freedom of trade with control over the balance or
imbalance.

It would seem that the advantages of additional

markets and transactions might be secured without compromising
the position of control over reserves and the balance of payments.
Such methods would tend to counteract the Soviet advantage of
48
centralized control by the State.
Should such a proposal be adopted and a trade agreement
be reached, a reversal of national policy would have occurred.
This national policy toward the Soviet bloc has been one of
economic discrimination, but one which has become increasingly

^Raymond Vernon, "Solutions:
The Dollar in Crisis, pp. 219-220.
98 lbj d .,

p. 220.
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ineffectual in persuading other countries to follow suit.

Such a,

policy change would involve, among oilier things, a. revision of
certain legislation, notably the Export Control Act and the
Battle Act.1'*"® Non-compliance with this legislation carries the
danger of the abolition of aid.

Despite the problems in making

these moderately revolutionary changes, the necessity for trade
advantages might overshadow the obstacles.
Finally, should it be the case that none of these avenues
were to lead to equilibrium through political channels, or were
found to be objectionable, and yet the need was of such urgency,
one other solution seems possible.

Since the United States al

ready has a surplus of exports over imports and needs only to
equalize or exceed payments, the possibility, although not prob
ability, of reducing or eliminating foreign aid and defense ex
penditures exists.

Such action could, of course, spawn unpre

dictable political ramifications which, in the extreme, might
lead to an international devaluation of the United States among
the underdeveloped countries.
In summary, movements in wages, productivity, and export
prices considered together do tend to support the thesis of a
deterioration of the American position.

As a result, Western

Europe and Japan gain to a great extent because they attract
American capital in large amounts.

This in itself is a measure

of Western European and Japanese advancement because they export

'^The Export Control Act covers export-licensing stan
dards and the Battle Act proscribes what products may be shipped
to the Soviet bloc by foreign-aid recipients.
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more as their capacity increases.

The question developing, then,

is, if domestic and foreign policy changes or modifications con
tinue to fail to deal effectively with the balance-of-payments
deficit, should the United States consider a. reduction or
elimination of foreign defense and aid expenditures?

CHAPTER III

CURRENT ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
In the preceding chapter, one of the possibilities which
has been suggested for reducing the United States balance-ofpayments deficit and, thereby, achieving an equilibrium or a
favorable balance was to cut foreign defense and economic assis
tance expenditures.

Such a recommendation might eliminate the

deficit since the trade surplus has been insufficient to meet
foreign commitments.

Consideration of remedial action in this

area, however, entails not only the question of whether foreign
aid expenditures should be reduced, but also would a profit be
gained significant enough to compensate for the tremendous in
tangible loss which would occur?
It has been previously stated that the United States ac
cepted the responsibilities for defense and economic assistance
of foreign underdeveloped countries through the default of
Western Europe after World War II.

Assumption of this responsi

bility on a unilateral basis following the war, however, was pre
figured by other steps begun on an international and multilateral
basis as early as 19MM.

At that time, the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were created with the intention of
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avoiding a chaotic economic situation such as that which followed
World War I.1
For national security reasons, emphasis was placed upon
world economic stability to be achieved through reconstruction
and development.

These plans, therefore, were to include both

industrialized countries recovering from the effects of war and
those nations not yet modernized or industrialized.
Subsequently, a number of agencies in addition to the
World Bank have functioned through the United Nations and con
centrated solely upon economic development.

Since they consist

of multi-nation membership and are not political in nature, i.e.,
they neither vote within the United Nations General Assembly nor
become involved, in military matters with other nations, these
agencies have been relatively free from criticism and unhampered
in their operations.

These operations, however, are quite

limited in scope since only 10 percent of the total world eco2
nomic assistance funds are channeled through them.
Rather than administer its assistance programs throug+i
international agencies or through multilateral agreements of
another sort, the United States chose to oversee and control its*
2

^The International Monetary Fund was established by the
Bretton Woods Agreement of 19lM+. Its purpose has been to pro
vide external reserves and impose rules of behavior on national
authorities to coordinate their action. For a discussion of its
operations, see Tibor Scitovsky, Money and the Balance of
Payments (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 19G9) , pp. 159178.
2
Wolfgang G. Friedmann, George Kalmanoff, and Robert F.
Meagher, International F inancial Aid (New York: Columbia Uni
versity Press, 19GG) , p. 383.
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comprehensive programs on a unilateral basis.

With the vacuum

left by the decline of Western Europe and the apprehension
regarding Russian intentions in the postwar period augmented by
the specter of numerous repetitions throughout the world of com
munist usurpations, acceptance of a foreign assistance program
was not strongly contested.

Indeed, it may very well have had

its roots as early as the 1920Ts, as a response to the second
World Congress of the Communist International.

It was there that

a challenge was issued to the colonial and dependent countries
to revolt against their oppressors, or Western overlords.

Since

the end of World War II, it has been the United States which has
sought to meet this challenge and deny both influence and control
within the underdeveloped world to Russian or other forms of
Communism.

It is for this reason that foreign assistance is as

much political in nature as it is economic.
Indicative of this political aspect is the very origin of
the foreign aid program, which was begun under President Harry
Truman.

In January of 1999, after the President’s Inaugural

Address, the United States aid program was begun under the Mutual
Security Administration.

This is significant in that a key prem

ise was maintaining internal and external security.

Foreign

aid, then, was justified through linkage to the communist threat
and, ultimately, to national survival.

The importance attached

to the program is seen in the fact that the nation diverted
$'l billion in one year for foreign aid, a sum which matched the

L|6

total outlay for the development of the atomic bomb only a few
,•
3
years earlier.
What began with a sense of urgency and immediacy and
with cohesiveness of supporters, however, has experienced a loss
in momentum as it became increasingly clear that foreign aid
assistance was a very prolonged and long-term proposition.
gevity was not accented in the initial stage.

Lon

Subsequently, it

has gained attention as a subject of political debate.
tions not only of duration have been raised, however.

Ques
In

addition, motives, objectives, and measurable or demonstrable
results have been subjects of contention.

This is particularly

true since recent and frequent attempts have been made to attach
the issue of foreign aid to the balance-of-payments problem.
For national security reasons, therefore, foreign aid
has been continued up to and throughout the 1960’s, and no termin
ation date has been projected for the immediate future.

This

endurance, however, has not been unchallenged, with the result
that both the appropriations requested by the Administration and
the outlays passed by Congress have been reduced in recent years.
What, then, has vindicated the continuation of a seem
ingly unpopular program?

This is partially explained by the

background of the foreign aid program.

The precedent for foreign

aid was set during the Truman administration.

York:

It was followed in3

3
John I). Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 11.

>17

the Eisenhower years, but not with the same clear consensus of
purpose either by the public or within the Congress.

As Presi

dent Eisenhower noted,
foreign aid doesn’t have any pressure groups in any Con
gressman’s district. It is something that has to depend
on the intelligence of the American people and not on
selfish interest.
Depending upon that intelligence, however, has resulted in fluc
tuations and an unstable history for foreign aid.

Appealing to

something of a more basic interest, President Kennedy resurrected
the earlier and easily comprehended threat to national security,
but softened his plea with an element of conscience.

In a policy

statement issued in 1961, President Kennedy said that
The economic collapse of those free but less-developed na
tions which now stand poised between sustained growth and
economic chaos would be disastrous to our national security,
harmful to our comparative prosperity, and offensive to our
conscience.^
These reasons, then, protection, prosperity, material well-being
and moral reparation have formed the basis of the rationale for
engaging in a continuing foreign aid assistance program.
With this rationale as a basis for action, what objec
tives have been established?

Very broadly, the policy objectives

have been as follows:

>1
U.S., President, Department of State Bulletin, May 27,
1957, p. 8>l8.
'’President John F. Kennedy, ’’Foreign Aid, 1961,” in Why
Foreign Aid?, cd. by Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally
and Co., 1962), p. 1.
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1.

similar to all foreign policy, produce a political and
economic environment in which the United States can best
pursue its own social goals;

2.

promote internal security through financial assistance,
which will short-circuit internal disorders and stabilize
existing governments; (The conflict here, of course, is
that existing governments may resist needed changes, and
internal disorders which are aimed at change may be sup
pressed, thereby thwarting United States long-range
goals.)

3.

and, insure the security of the United States and its
allies from external aggression by providing military
installations and armaments.

These objectives of production, promotion, and provision were to
be achieved through implementation of five categories of aid.
These are:
1.

Development Grants, with provision for personnel, capital
goods, and commodities, and with emphasis on education.

2.

Development loans, aimed at long-range development and
repeiyable in dollars.

3.

Supporting assistance, including both grants and loans
intended to promote internal security, while balancing
military expenditures.

i+.

Military assistance, including grants, loans, and the
provision for military equipment, supplies, and training
assistance, initially aimed at external security but with
an additional thrust toward internal stability as well.

5.

Food for Peace, offering grants, loans, or sales for
local currency of surplus agricultural commodities.7

While the objectives and means of implementation are easily
enough delineated, the overriding problem has been evaluating the

Ulollis T5. Chencry, "Objectives and Criteria for Foreign
Assistance," in Why Foreign Aid?, ed. by Robert A. Goldwin
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1902), p. 33.
^Ibid., p . 3M .
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effect of this assistance.

The difficulty and, frequently, the

impossibility of ascertaining the effect or of pinpointing tan
gible and defensible results, short of becoming deeply involved
in the internal affairs of recipient nations, has been a per
plexing one.
The ambivalence surrounding the documentation of foreign
aid assistance has, therefore, created an air of both uncertainty
and skepticism.

One exception to this, however, has been the

area of military assistance which seems to have generated little
dissension over amount or motive.
ever, has been questioned.

Its long-range effect, how

Since military assistance frequently

has the effect of stifling the influence of more progressive
orientation by strengthening existing political conditions, its
long-range value might be questionable.

On the other hand, by

maintaining stability, military assistance insures the opportunity
for advancement.

Such assistance, in any case, does involve the

United States in the internal affail’s of another country, how
ever tacitly.
With the tension between the balance-of-payments problem
and its connections to both trade and aid, it would seem that
attention would have to be devoted to dollar deployment on an
individual country basis.

Since the aspects and aspirations of

each country differ, the United States has been constantly faced
with choosing among them.

As a matter of practicality, it ap

pears tliat the choice has been made on the basis of which coun
tries could be expected to profit most from international fi
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nancial assistance.

While this viewpoint does remove the justi

fication of foreign aid from a moral plane, it also seems to
assume that economic assistance programs are not temporary, but
rather are representative of an historical trend.
At the same time, the hostility confronting the United
States in some of the underdeveloped countries is the product of
decades of resentment, seemingly not entirely without justifica
tion, particularly in the area of military intervention.

This

fear and resentment has been carried over to the negotiations
concerning assistance, for these countries seem to fear that a
different kind of intervention in their internal affairs will
take place, i.e., economic interference.

Such occurrence would

not be without historical precedent, e.g., the Dominican Republic,
1905.
Added to the tendency for political instability and
chronic poverty, the underlying uncertainties regarding the
motivation and intentions of the United States have caused some
uncertainty among the developing nations regarding their own
adoption of capitalism.

Therefore, broad foreign aid objectives,

especially in the pursuit of national social goals, are under
mined.

That which is being exported is not only financial aid

but also ideology, for in the current war of ideas to enhance in
fluence over underdeveloped countries is a strategic objective.
To export capitalism, however, is no simple matter, for
that which is being passed on appears not to be truly repre
sentative of the American system.

Those elements which seem to
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be missing in exported capitalism are pragmatism, compromise,
individualism, pluralism, and democracy, each of which has been
O
an integral part in the development of the American system.
What has been missing in exported capitalism, then, seems to be
some reconciliation between democratic freedom for the individual
and a steadily increasing economic growth rate.
Furthermore, it seems that under these circumstances,
military assistance has been an influence upon the effectiveness
of the foreign aid program since its beginning.

The assertion

has been made that ’’nothing could so damage /the United States/
the world around as a policy that sought to sustain its own
military power at the expense of efforts to aid the poor people
and the poor lands.”9

If this assertion is correct, then the

military assistance program assumes increasing significance.

Not

only is it of political significance, however, for its economic
impact is also of consequence.
Since this expenditure in the past has been separate from
economic development assistance, its contribution to the balanceof-payments deficit has been obscured.

Therefore, in light of

the political and economic significance, the argument has been
made that closer attention should be paid to the security which
g
R. Joseph Monsen, Jr., Modern American Capitalism.
Ideologies and Issues (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963),
p. 121.
9
John Kenneth Galbraith, "Some? Thoughts on Public Poll cy
and the Dollar Problem,” in Harris, The Dollar in Crisis, p. 95.
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is bought and to its effects.

Considering the difficulties en

countered in modifying the balance-of-payments deficit, economic
as well as political scrutiny would seem well-advised.
This is not to say, however, that foreign aid military
expenditures should be eliminated.

Rather, such a viewpoint

attempts to realistically take into account that a direct rela
tionship between assistance given to foreign countries and their
favorable economic development does not necessarily follow if
contradictory programs exist.

Moreover, even generous and con

tinuous aid cannot insure peaceful as well as progressive eco
nomic development.
If, in fact, there is no guaranteed link between foreign
assistance and economic progress, nor any assurance that United
States objectives will be met, why then continue?

Questions

regarding the advisability of foreign economic assistance from a
self-interest standpoint have been raised since the beginning of
the program.

Even Western Europeans registered surprise at

American willingness to export capital to areas which undoubtedly
would be competitors in only a few years.

In commenting on

the large-scale assistance made available to Western Europe and
Japan after World War II, the Economic Commission for Europe,
staffed primarily by Europeans, noted that
The United States is thus in the strange position of fi
nancing a programme which is directed largely towards the
reduction of its own exports. It faces the anomalous
prospect that, by the end of the programme, it will have

^ J o h n Kenneth Galbraith, "Some Thoughts on Public Policy
and the Dollar Problem," in Harris, The Dollar in Crisis, p. 95.
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surpluses and excess production capacity in commodities
for which it has helped (directly or indirectly) to de
velop substitute sources of supply elsewhere; its own ex
ports to Europe will be reduced below the depression-shrunk
volume of 1938 and Europe nevertheless will still be short
of dollars to cover its imports from the United States.
Despite these dire observations, the assistance was provided, and
Western Europe did recover and become highly competitive once
again, but the volume of United States exports did not diminish
to a crisis level, nor has Europe lacked dollars for payments.
Perhaps the best explanation for America’s continued industrial
leadership is that it has maintained its economic growth and
concentrated upon technological innovation, and has demonstrated
that these areas are essential to such leadership.

12

In the early post-World War II period, therefore, the
prevailing American attitude was characterized by the belief that
the foreign aid program was to the benefit of the United States
as well as to the recipient country.
was not universally shared.

This viewpoint, however,

More recently, the foreign aid pro

gram has been continued in spite of persistent internal criti
cism.

The rationale has been that the risks involved are too

great to abandon this policy.

■^Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of
Europe in 19M8 (Geneva: Economic Commission, 19M9), p. 222.
12

Albert 0. Hirschman, ’’Effects of Industrialization on
the Makers of Industrial Countries,” in The Progress of Under
developed Areas, ed. by Berthold. F. Iloselitz (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 283.
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Despite the lack of immediate and obviously favorable
results, the argument is often given that foreign aid has been
the means through which communist expansion in the so-called
"decisive third of humanity" has been curbed or at least tempo
rarily deterred.

Granted the potential negative aspects, (e.g.,

military assistance may threaten regional stability or failure
of deterrents may result in communism taking over what has been
provided) nevertheless an overall net value has been calculated
to such an extent that assistance has continued. 13
Perhaps the most serious problem has been in setting the
goals too high, which has resulted in widespread public disen
chantment.
counter.

This disenchantment has been very difficult to
Efforts to present foreign aid assistance in a positive

framework have concentrated upon the practical and the possible,
rather than humanitarianism or the crusading spirit.

The

creation of new markets for future trade has presented foreign
aid as a positive, sound investment.

In the meantime, however,

a national deficit has been plaguing the country, and the direct
connection between the two has been made far too often.
One method directed toward both tasks (i.e., supple
menting trade and improving the deficit) has been the use of
tied aid requirements.

These requirements have met with much

resistance in aid-receiving countries.

The opposition to this

method has claimed that the expenditures for economic aid appear
minute in the United States budget.

The basis for this conclu-

■*''^Montgomery, The Politics of foreign Aid, p. 19.
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sion is a comparison between the United States national income or
Gross National Product (GNP) and the percent of this amount allo
cated for foreign aid.

For instance, in requesting Congress to

allocate $3.58 billion for military and economic assistance for
fiscal year 1966, the Administration stressed that such allocation
would represent
the smallest burden_on the American taxpayer: one-half of
one percent of /the/ GNP (compared with 2% at the height of
the Marshall Plan), and 3.5% of the federal budget (compared
with nearly 12% seventeen years ago.
Therefore, foreign aid assistance, both military and economic
development, would appear to he a small percentage of the present
national income as well as considerably less than previous allo
cations.

For this reason, so the opposition concludes, tying

aid, or requiring that funds provided by assistance programs be
used for purchases in the donor country, would accomplish little
in solving the economic problems of the United States.
On the other hand, questions have been raised as to the
validity of this view.

Since Congress has appropriated funds for

military assistance separately from economic development assis
tance in the past, the possibility has been suggested that classi
fication under direct and indirect military aid could be expanded.
This possibility relates to the general Congressional acceptance
of military assistance requests as contrasted to its increasing
resistance to economic development funding.

Consequently, the

1,,U.S. , AID and II.S. Department of Defense, Proposed
Mutual Defense and Development Programs for FY 1966 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 5.
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allegation has arisen that "what in form is straight military aid
may in effect be equivalent to economic aid, and it is often
difficult to distinguish.”"*""’ If economic aid should be more
significant than government statistics indicate, tied aid might
prove to be of some benefit to the United States, although not
necessarily to the aid recipient.
The claim that tied aid is not necessarily beneficial to
the recipient country is substantiated by strong resistance to
this practice.

The degree of resistance to the tied-aid concept

is seen in a 196b United Nations Conference resolution, which was
supported by virtually all recipient countries.

X6

The resolution

claimed that the practice of tying aid to purchases in the donor
country inhibits international competition and limits the freedom
of choice on the part of the recipient country.

However, the

resolution also recognized the validity of some of the reasons
17
why this practice is followed.
In spite of criticism, however, this practice of tying
aid has been continued.

It has been suggested that "probably the

■'--’Milton Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and
Objectives," in Problems of the Modern Economy, ed. by Edmund S.
Phelps (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1966), p. 958.
-*-^This resolution was adopted by a vote of 81 to 9, with
25 abstentions. The negative votes and abstentions were pri
marily those of the developed countries, including the Soviet
bloc.
^United Nations, Conference, Rcv.iow of Iinternational
and
Development (UNCTAD, Inf. 1), 1966 , P . Tl-5.
Trade
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most compelling circumstances in the increasing trend toward
country

tying of aid is the balance-of-payments problem of the

18
United States.11

Since the United States is the largest single

donor in providing funds for underdeveloped countries, as demon
strated in the following chart, and since the United States has
followed the practice of tied aid since 1959, other countries
engaging in foreign aid have not been inclined to modify or
abandon this practice either.
TABLE II
LONG-TERM OFFICIAL CAPITAL TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1956-6b
(Values in Millions of Dollars)
TOTAL DAC COUNTRIES
Year
Value
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
196b

3,206
3,753
b. 285
b ,23 2
b,898
6,07b
6,0b3
6,060
5,908

Source:

%
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

UNITED STATES
Value
%
1,996
2,083
2,388
2,310
2,850
3,535
3,713
3 ,8b2
3,53b

62.3
55.5
55.7
5b.6
58.2
58.2
61. b
63. b
59.8

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
1965 Review (New York: OECD , 1965), p. 127.

Whether or not other countries would be so disposed should
the United States release its bilateral , tied funds is a matter
of conjecture.

Surely they would realize tangible gains, while

the United States could achieve only intangible ones and risk

1H1'riedmann, Internationn!

Financial Aid, p . '121.
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political support for the continuation of foreign aid appropria
tions as well.

Certainly one of the arguments favoring the pro

gram has been the feedback to American industry,

funds made

available to underdeveloped countries would be returned in the
purchase of equipment and goods, thereby meeting economic as
well as political concerns.

Therefore, while balance-of-payments

problems may be the immediate cause of tied aid, economic and
political reasons may offer an enduring explanation.
Such a practice, however, is neither unique nor limited
to the United States.

This practice has been followed by the

Soviet bloc as a political link with the recipient country.
In the United States, tied aid has been the policy of the ExportImport Bank since its inception.

Furthermore, the aid program

administered by the Agency for International Development (AID)
is tied primarily for balance-of-payments reasons, but is in
fluenced by commercial reasons as well.
In presenting the AID program for fiscal year 1966, the
Administration emphasized that "the U.S. procurement policies
followed over the past four years have minimized the drain of
our assistance programs on our balance of payments . . . /and
asserted that/ another result of AID’S procurement policy is a
19
substantial export business for American private enterprise.”

19 U.S., AID and U.S. Department of Defense, Proposed
Mutual Defense and Development Programs for FY 1966, p. 17.
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Consequently, it would seem that, lacking the influence and
pressure of foreign aid recipients, members of Congress would be
more sensitive to commercially-concerned constituents.

Further

more, they might continue to support foreign aid appropriations
despite balance-of-payments problems as long as the aid was tied,
thus profiting the industrial sector of the United States.
While tied aid may claim to have some advantages, dis
advantages also exist.

Not only is tied aid opposed by most

recipient countries, but it may also conflict with the primary
purpose of the overall foreign aid program, which is economic
development.

Since the basis of economic development is thought

to be the availability of capital, and aid-recipient countries
have been unable to provide capital for themselves, the United
States has done so.

The result has been a virtual obsession

with centralized planning and control by the government.

Under

these circumstances, pressure for demonstrable progress to the
natives of a country, the donor, and the world has given rise to
"monument building.”

Just as man desires and demands symbols in

religion and politics, so he does in economics.

Conceivably,

much money can be and is wasted on symbolic though economically
meaningless and undesirable projects.
Not only may the government construct unfruitful, waste
ful projects, but its very decision-making process may strangle
flexibility.

Consequently, it would seem that the very prin

ciples of the communist system, from which the United States has
been seeking to protect these underdeveloped countries, is
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promoted by its own economic aid dollars.^

The ultimate effect

then might be to hasten the spread of Communism in the under
developed world. 2-*The question posed is why the underdeveloped countries
would be so strongly in favor of centralized government and
central planning.

This inclination appears to stem from disen

chantment with the free market mechanism.

Too often the under

developed countries have been in the position of having no market
for their products due to high tariffs and trade barriers.

This

situation has further tended to inhibit foreign investment in
comparison to that in developed countries.
This situation is somewhat more understandable, however,
when the fact is considered that underdeveloped countries as a
whole "contribute less than half of the worldTs primary ex
ports.

in addition, these countries are highly dependent upon

some few major exports and are quite vulnerable to world market
fluctuations.

For these reasons, strong emphasis has been placed

on central planning and control.
To avoid the restrictions of central planning, an alter
native has been sought.

One proposal has been that the United

States openly announce that by a specified date, it will have
?nMilton Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and
Objectives," in Phelps, Problems of the Modern Economy, p. 441.
^"*"Ibid., p. 44 6.
P
cPIlia Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries
(New York; Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964), p. 25.
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abolished all tariffs, quotas, and restrictions in favor of free
trade in the most literal sense.

Its proponent asks:

Can there be any doubt that the effects on our international
position--both immediate through the announcement effects
and ultimately through the long-run economic effects--would
be vastly more favorable than those achievable by any con
ceivable program of foreign economic aid even if one assigns
to that aid all the virtues claimed by its proponents?^
Temporarily ignoring the related difficulties, it has been argued
that such action would benefit the United States multilaterally
and would have more influence psychologically than the foreign
aid which has already been provided.

Furthermore, the "transi

tion to free trade would have far less of an impact than techno
logical changes that occur decade after decade and that /the
United States/ take/s/ in . . . stride."

In such a viewpoint,

termination of foreign aid would offer no insurmountable problem.
The solution would be to make one large and final payment which
would have been announced well in advance.
Such an approach would offer one decisive and final
resolution to the dilemma of long-range commitment to foreign
aid and its deteriorating effect on the balance of payments.
Short of taking such radically liberal action, however, other
means have been utilized, notably the tied aid requirement.

This

approach has been expedient because it can be invoked unilater
ally and brings quick results.

Conversely, tied aid appears

to be essentially protectionist in nature and may hinder

23 ._ .
Milton Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and
Objectives," in Phelps, Problems of the Modern Economy, P . h51.
2M
lb id.5 p. H52.
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developing countries by requiring them to make purchases in the
United States which could possibly he bought on the competitive
market for less.

Nevertheless, the alternative of reducing for

eign aid would seem to be more detrimental to their overall econ
omic development than continuation of tied aid requirements.
The gain from tied aid, however, may he less than ex
pected because of the reduction of American exports to other
countries and the possibility of aid countries "leaking” or di
verting purchases to other countries.

Still, it is claimed

that "tied aid makes a significant contribution to easing /the
25
United States/ dollar problem."

Despite this easing of the

problem, the foreign aid program as a whole has undergone much
criticism in the 1960’s.

This widespread criticism, notably
26
that of the Clay Committee,
has been reflected in Congressional
scrutiny of foreign economic aid proposals and their justifica
tion.
While the findings of the Clay Committee were supported
in some areas, these findings served primarily to substantiate
criticisms circulating at the time, (e.g., inadequate contribu
tions from abroad, failure of self-help by the recipients,

25

Harris, Economics of the Kennedy Years, p. 157.
nr
^uThe Clay Committee chaired by General Lucius Clay pre
sented its Report on Foreign Aid in 1963. The Committee’s find
ings emphasized the adverse effect of foreign aid on the balance
of payments. The result of these findings will be discussed
further in Chapter IV.
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excessive aid for unjustified political reasons, overextension
geographically), and also contributed to the program cuts of
27
1963.
Indeed, the program appears to have reached its summit
in the immediate postwar period from 1946 to 19M9.

Thereafter,

it has experienced a slow proportionate decline in relation to
the rise in GNP and export activity.
In addition to tied aid, other methods of foreign assis
tance which are profitable to both donor and recipient have been
sought.

For instance, surplus goods have been given away, sold

below market prices, or for foreign currencies.

The essential

effect of these practices, however, has been to increase both
exports and foreign aid.

Consequently, no net improvement has

been realized in the balance-of-payments deficit.

Therefore,

with the exhaustion or failure of numerous experiments, separate
and interrelated, attention has turned to increasing the parti
cipation of other developed nations.
If the United States is unable to achieve either larger
exports or smaller imports without damaging its trade relations
with Western European countries and Japan, then perhaps these
other developed countries should participate more fully in for
eign economic and defense outlays.

This argument recognizes

that a balance-of-payments deficit in the United States cor
responds to a surplus in other countries, and those which have
a surplus could assist in reestablishing equilibrium.

27

This

Harris, Economics of the Kennedy Years, p. 173.
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would be one means of offsetting the pressure of American de
fense and aid expenditures, if the decision is reached that re
duction "is not the solution called for by economic conditions
in this country or by political conditions abroad."

28

Rather,

this argument might suggest that expenditures should be in
creased and, in order to do so, contributions from the surplus
countries are needed.

While this action alone would not totally

eliminate the balance-of-payments problem, with the help of
other measures adopted by the surplus countries, it might con
siderably improve it.
It has been pointed out frequently that continued ac
cumulation of reserves is not in the interest of the surplus
countries.

Such a practice "deprives the people of the oppor

tunity to use more of their own output for consumption and
home investment and for the acquisition of income-earning assets
29
in private investment abroad."
Besides sharing responsibility
for foreign defense and aid, surplus countries could also in
crease their imports and foreign investment as additional
measures aimed at international equilibrium.
The real question, then, is not whether the United States
can afford its foreign aid program, but rather should it continue
to relieve other high-income countries of a share in international

TO
Edward M. Bernstein, "The New Administration and the
Dollar Payments ProbJ_em," in Harris, The Dollar in Crisis, p. 84.
^ Ib id., p . 8M .
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defense outlays.

Although it should be recognized that the GNP

of surplus nations does not compare with the United States GNP,
soon to be exceeding $1,000 billion, nevertheless their recent
growth partially has been made possible by the release from high
defense costs, both internally and externally.

However, it does

seem almost unjustifiable that the United States should virtually
beg these countries to share the burden of foreign aid, consid
ering that the United States has a per capita income of two to
three times that of most of the Western European countries.

30

While it might be argued on the basis of per capita in
come that allocations could be increased, this is not feasible
from a balance-of-payments standpoint.

Again, the options seem

to be reduced to a rise in exports, a decline in imports, or a
reduction in foreign aid expenditures.

With these alternatives,

sometimes it is argued that the United States cannot afford to
relieve other high-income countries of sharing the burden of
defense and aid.

The question is how to accomplish this burden-

sharing.
Accompli sliment presupposes that surplus countries would
acquiesce to and accept these expenditures. Yet, it appears
that some countries have been unwilling to continue accepting
United States world leadership without challenge.
should deference be given in the economic realm?

Why, then,
The answer to

this question seems to relate to the post-World War II change in
the concept of power’.
30

Harris, The Dollar in Crisis, p. 9.

66

One very influential reason for any involvement in for
eign aid programs, which undoubtedly has some bearing on the
attitude of Western European countries and Japan, is this changed
concept of power.

Both economically and politically, such new

national power alignments as the Afro-Asian Group, the Fourth
Force and the Neutralists have created an enlarged concept of
power.

This concept is demonstrated in the changing role of the

military.
Until recently, power, in the twentieth century as well
as a good part of history, has been equated with military might.
The change which has occurred recently is that influence can be
as effectively exerted through economic means as well as through
military means.

This change has been made possible by the ex

treme poverty and lack of fully developed social order in the
developing nations and, hence, the need for economic assistance.
Given the need for economic assistance and the deploy
ment of dollars which has already taken place, the question be
comes one of individual evaluation.

How successful have the

methods of the United States been in achieving the stated goal,
i.e., establishing a stable, free, democratic/capitalistic so
ciety within a particular country?

While precise gauging of

this success is nebulous, the fact that capitalism faces a
serious challenge is easily enough recognized.

Essentially,

economists have failed to convince aid-recipient countries that
American and British-stylc economic development systems can
produce growth either as rapidly as other systems, or rapidly
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enough to prevent social disorder and revolution, while coping
with the underlying complication of the population explosion.
In short, the question has not been satisfactorily settled as to
how economic development can best be achieved, as well as maxi
mum personal choice attained, insofar as the developing countries
are concerned.
With the power base broadened to include economic, politi
cal and military strength, the struggle for economic superiority
has shifted from physical to ideological conflict.

This ideolog

ical conflict has exposed itself in economic warfare, which is a
new dimension of hostilities.

This new dimension of hostilities

has been defined as follows:
Economic warfare is an integrated program taking in more
than just the question of international trade relations
in troubled times . . . rather, it encompass/es7 all
those actions in either Cold or Hot War on the domestic
and foreign front that are designed to enhance our own
or our allies economic strength for national security, or
to detract from the adversary’s economic potential.'’1
Not only has the primary weapon shifted from military to economic
strength, but the time span also differs.

In the twentieth cen

tury, wars have generally been considered temporary.

By con

trast, economic warfare as well as economic mobilization is not
temporary and should be recognized as an historical trend.

This

is demonstrated by the Soviet Union’s avowed and frequently ar
ticulated commitment to economic warfare.

Therefore, as long as

this is the case, trade as well as aid will have political
connotations.

York:

John J. Clark, The Now Economics of National Defense
Random House, Inc., I'JOGJ , p. ISM.
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Economic warfare is in one sense a repetition of the
past, but in another, parallels the development of human con
flict.

The evolution of economic warfare has paralleled that of

human conflict in that it has progressed from limited to total
to unified warfare.

32

The level on which warfare is conducted

today, the unified level, allows for peace to exist only inter
mittently.

The manner in which this warfare is conducted in

cludes:
1.

denial of resources to the enemy which, of course, may
result in reciprocal measures, thereby accomplishing
only minimal benefits;

2.

utilization of foreign aid programs aiming at long-range
results, which are formulated on the basis of strategic
considerations; and

3.

emphasis on continued economic growth internally, rather
than a mobilization of forces.*
3
Economic considerations, then, may exert a tremendous

and possibly a deciding influence on strategy.

Moreover, the

significance of economic policy and performance in the Cold War
has been that it has become the criteria for positioning the
nation in the world power alignment.

In effect, economic sup

port has bolstered political and military influence.

For these

reasons, economic policy is directly tied to foreign policy
objectives.

*D n

3^Clark, The New Economics of National Defense, p. 1511.
33Ibid., p. 157.
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Although a direct relationship does exist in this area,
as well as in the others already mentioned, economic warfare in
its utilization of foreign aid contains a contradiction.

An area

of conflict has developed between the two components of foreign
aid, military and economic assistance.

Essentially, military

assistance is designed to preserve and protect existing institu
tions, policies, and governments, while economic assistance is
designed to induce changes in the status quo, encourage initiative
and innovation, and result in progress.
Furthermore, this conflict is reflected within the under
developed nations receiving aid.

The "war of ideas" being waged

between the West and the East has resulted in the "export of
ideology" and the great difficulty of importation by developing
countries.

The conflict arises from the inability of developing

nations to adhere to either Western or Eastern ideology, pri
marily because of the economic split that divides the developed,
wealthy North from the underdeveloped, impoverished South.
Since the problem has an economic basis, the thrust of
United States policy has been toward alleviating economic lag,
while assuming that the political situation would thereby also
be resolved.

This approach has lacked effectiveness in large

part because "export capitalism" has not included all the com
ponents of American capitalism.
seems contradictory.

Furthermore, economic warfare

On the one hand, it sanctions liberalized

trade even with a known ideological opponent.

On the other hand,

7G

it extends aid to uncommitted nations.

In the final analysis,

"economic warfare employs economic power to shape world affairs
31+
in a fashion compatible with national interest."
Of over
riding and unresolved importance is determination of what the
national interest really is, or of what takes precedence at the
particular time.
In short, the dilemma of ideological conflict is re
flected in the interrelation of international trade practices,
domestic policy, and foreign aid programs.

In the conduct of

economic warfare, it may appear to be in the nation’s best
interest to trade with an admitted enemy, to mobilize forces
for expansionary domestic policies to facilitate growth, and to
use foreign aid programs to buy friends.

Justification and

approval of these policies prefigure sanctioning a deficit in
the balance of payments.

3M

Clark, The New Economics of National Defense, p. 176.

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRENDS OF TIE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD

Certain significant trends which have affected the
American balance-of-payments situation in the post-World War II
era are quite readily recognizable.
thoroughly documented.

Moreover, they have been

These include the relative decline of

the United States trade position internationally and the con
tinuation of a bilateral aid program despite persistent deficits
Others, while less readily apparent, are rather commonly ac
cepted.

These include the evolution of economic warfare and its

relevance to trade and aid considerations, and the decline of
American leadership among Western nations in political and eco
nomic affairs.

Additionally, there are still others that have

been advanced by some authorities but probably should be quali
fied.

Qualification is necessary because of the wide divergency

of opinion among those considered to be authorities.

Included

among these possibilities is the culmination of prolonged
balance-of-payments deficits in international economic chaos.
Such chaos would be the combined product of the failure of inter
national negotiations and of ineffective domestic economic
policies to control inflation.
These authorities or influentials include economists,
members of the academic community, government officials, bankers
71
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and businessmen.

Such categorization, however, is not static.

Rather a very fluid situation seems to exist among these group
ings.

Furthermore, many of these authorities hold contradic

tory opinions, and present impressive documentation to support
their particular conclusions.

Consequently, the executive and

legislative branches have been presented many alternatives for
coping with both domestic and international economic problems.
Choosing among the alternatives available has resulted
in careful and lengthy deliberation followed by experimental
methods of coping with fiscal problems.

These experimental

methods have been offensive to some, unsatisfactory to many, and
inconclusive to most.

Disagreement has been evident not only

among authorities, however, but also among policy-makers, par
ticularly between the Administration and the Congress in the
area of foreign aid.

These problems, then, of maintaining and

hopefully improving export competitiveness, supporting an exten
sive foreign aid program, and reaching an agreeable reform for
the present international monetary system, illustrate the per
plexing economic concerns which have emerged in the post-World
War II era, all of which directly relate to the American balance
of-payments problem.
Efforts toward improvement of the American balance-ofpayments problem, moreover, have met with and been affected by
external developments over which the United States has been
unable to exercise full control.

Among these developments has

been the growth of the European Economic Community, commonly
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referred to as the European Common Market.

This organization is

reputed to be the largest trading unit in the world economy and
has diverted some trade from United States exports.^

Likewise,

foreign aid expenditures originated in response to an external
situation, i.e., the threat of the spread of Communism through
out the underdeveloped world.

In the past decade, foreign aid

expenditures appear to have become self-perpetuating.

Further

more, the need or demand for this assistance has been exceeding
the supply approved, yet no termination date has been projected
at the present time.
Finally, the problem of international liquidity has re
appeared in the postwar period.

A major topic of discussion

during the economic crisis period of the 1930's, the subject of
international liquidity was thereafter diminished by World
War II, postwar recovery, and international security considera
tions.

Only recently, with the persistence of balance-of-

payments deficits, has the subject been revived in the United
States.

Agreement on proposed reforms and continuing interna

tional cooperation, however, has not been attained.

Neverthe

less, the need for reform has generally been recognized through
out the world.
Long-range objectives, therefore, have not been success
fully established in regard to these problems.

Rather, fiscal

policy often appears to have been the product of seemingly

Delbert A. Snider, Intornationnl Monetary Relations
(New York: Random House, I960), p. 110-111.

disconnected problems resolved on an individual basis as the need
arose, with only temporary solutions applied.

Monetary policy,

on the other hand, may be moving toward a more comprehensive
solution.

This situation, however, is perhaps more reflective

of the political decision-making process than of the economic
considerations involved.
While it has been claimed that the relative trade posi
tion has declined, it should also be pointed out that the United
States claims the distinction of being the largest producing
nation in the world, ranking fourth among the nations of the
world in population, and possessing an unequalled level of per
capita income; also, the United States is the world’s largest
2
domestic market as well as the largest source of savings.
Stated
another way, the United States is often described as having about
one-sixth of the world’s population and possessing between onethird and one-half of the world’s wealth.

With such a distinc

tive economic situation, an explanation for the decline rests in
part on what facilitated this preeminence.
Economic superiority, until recently, has been promoted
by certain unique features of geography and economic structure.
With the disappearance of some of these advantages, relative
decline in international competitiveness has occurred.

Among

these vanishing advantages, some of which have already been2

2
Council of Economic Advisers, "The United States as
World Trader, Investor, and Banker,’’ in Problems of the Modern
Economy, ed. by Edmund S. Phelps (Now York: W. W. Norton and
Co., Inc., 19GG) , p. 337.
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mentioned or alluded to, are
1.

the possession of large supplies of cheap natural
materials, the reduction of which has forced the United
States to compete in world markets for scarce supplies;

2.

the benefit of high agricultural productivity, which
has been encumbered by government supports and controls
brought about by a market not truly free;

3.

the stability of relatively static concentrations of
capital, the end of which has been brought about by
improved communications;

M-.

the profits of entrepreneurship, which have been dimin
ished by capital outflows for private investment, ac
companied by American entrepreneurship, production
techniques, and product design;

5.

the opportunities of being one of very few nations en
gaging in mass production based upon available capital,
technological innovation, and market size; and,

6.

the maximation of American technological superiority
to insure competitiveness in world markets.

With the loss or reduction of four of these advantages which
directly relate to the balance-of-payments problem and to
American competitiveness, remedies have been avidly sought.
Since the outflow of private capital appears basic to
these same four points, efforts to isolate and control this
factor have been made.

While there has been quite a diversity

of opinion over the effects of private foreign investment and
the establishment of subsidiaries, branches, and licensees
abroad in other industrialized countries, arguments stressing
the adverse effect on the balance of payments have prevailed
momentarily.

In February of 1965, voluntary restraints were

Irving B. Kravis, "The U.S. Trade Position and the
Common Market,” in Phelps, Problems of the Modern economy,
pp. 350-365.
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initiated as part of a broad presidential program to countermand
4
further deterioration of the American balance of payments.
This program remained voluntary from 1965 through 1967, but on
January 1, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson announced a series of
new measures which included mandatory controls over foreign
5
investments.
Since their implementation, these controls have received
repeated criticism by those affected.

The regulations issued by

the Commerce Department which limit direct investment abroad and
require repatriation of foreign earnings have been opposed for the
same reasons that they were applied.

The opposition claims com

petitive disadvantages which ultimately will be injurious to the
balance of payments and will adversely affect American exports.
Retaliation also becomes a very real concern to this viewpoint.
In addition, the legal authority under which these controls were
issued has been questioned, allegations made that the balanceof-payments problem stems from fiscal disorder which is ob
scured by such regulations, and also state that such require0
ments place an intolerable administrative burden on industry.
Rather than these controls, industry’s spokesmen have favored
^Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Overseas
Manufacturing Investment and the Balance of Payments (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 142.
D.C.:

"’u.S., President, New Year’s Day Message (Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1968, p. 13.
0

u.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxa
tion, Digest of Oral Testimony Presented to the Committee on Ways
and Means with Respect to the Administration’s Hal anee-of-Payments
Proposals (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968),
pp. 'I-7.

77

a return to voluntary restrictions and. incentives.

Beyond this,

they have proposed the removal of the 30 percent withholding tax
exacted from dividends and interest paid on both corporate and
governmental securities, in order to increase foreign investment
in United States securities.'7
Offsetting the restrictions of mandatory controls was
the proposal of an expanded governmental program aimed at long
term export increase.

This five-year program was intended to

concentrate exclusively upon export expansion and promotion.
The President’s proposal resulted from a study completed and
issued in 1967 by one of the action committees of the National
Export Expansion Council.^

Under this program, business in

terest and cooperation was to be enhanced through a long-term
commitment by Government to export expansion.

Consequently,

business and industry, with this assurance, could better plan
and program their international affairs.

Specifically, the

President proposed an intensified five-year, $200 million Com
merce Department program to promote the sale of American goods
overseas and a joint export association program through which

^U.S., Congress, The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation, Digest of Oral Testimony Presented to the Committee on
Ways and Means with Respect to the Administration’s Balance-ofPayments Proposals, p . 8.
^The National Export Expansion Council was formed in
1960. It comprises 72 business and professional leaders who
serve in an advisory capacity to the Secretary of Commerce and
other Government Agencies concerned with United States foreign
trade.
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the Government would provide direct financial support to Ameri
can corporations which joined together to sell abroad.^*
Such a proposal represented a significant increase in
funding for such purposes.

In fiscal year 1960, the first

appropriations for the Commerce Department’s export expansion
activities were made.

An initial appropriation of $9.6 million

in 1960 grew to $12.2 million in 1968, showed little increase
until 1967 when it reached $18.7 million, and, finally, $19
million for fiscal year 1968.10

The objective of these activi

ties, as defined by the Assistant Secretary for Domestic and
International Business under the Johnson Administration,
Mr. Lawrence McQuade, has been to increase the United States
trade surplus by approximately $5 billion per year.

Such

growth would result in a total export goal for 1973 of $50 billion, or 8.3 percent of the projected gross national product.

12

To reach the desired level of $50 billion, exports would have to
maintain their rate of growth achieved annually since 1962, or
8.3 percent."^

®U.S., President, New Year’s Day Message, p. 11.
^nU.S„, Congress, Joint Economic Committee, A Review of
the Balance-of-Payments Policies (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1969), p. 11.

-^Ibld., p . 3.
-^According to Bureau of the Budget figures, the GNP has
been steadily rising from $95.0 billion in 1980 to $263.3 billion
in 1950, to $895.2 billion in 1960, and $817.0 billion in 1968.
The projected GNP for 1973 will be over $1,162 billion.
^ ~’U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, A Review oT
the Balance of Payments Policies, p. 6.
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To assist business in reaching this goal, the National
Export Expansion Council began identifying specific products as
well as strategic areas which might offer the most potential for
United States exports over a five-year p e r i o d . H o w e v e r ,
achievement of this projected goal presupposes certain domestic
as well as foreign conditions.

Since the United States is the

world's largest domestic market, comparable attractions would
have to exist overseas to encourage American business to shift
its emphasis abroad.
The difficulty of such an accomplishment is seen in the
extent of the current domestic orientation.

For instance, in

1967 exports represented only M- percent of the American gross
national product.

In comparison, Japan's exports represented

9 percent of its gross national product; French exports claimed
10 percent; Italy and the United Kingdom, 13 percent; West
Germany, 18 percent; Netherlands, 32 percent; and BelgiumLuxembourg, 35 percent.15

Therefore, such a change of priority

would seem to necessitate strong incentives for American busi
ness .
Even incentives and refocused emphasis alone, however,
would not suffice.

Other factors such as the purchasing power*

National Export Expansion Council, 1968 Reports on
Policies and Actions to Improve the U.S. Balance of Trade and
Balance of Payments (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce,
1968), p. 3.
*5Council of Economic Advisers, "The United States as
World Trader, Investor, and Banker," in Phelps, Problems of the
Modern Economy, p. 337.

80

and relative economic strength of AmericaTs major trading part
ners would also have influence.

Dynamic and expansive economies

abroad would encourage increased exports, and, likewise, eco
nomic slowdowns abroad would cause American exports to suffer.
More significant, however, is the American domestic economy.
Despite other disagreements, virtually every recommen
dation for improving the American balance-of-payments situation
includes the necessity of controlling domestic inflation.

The

continued rise in labor costs since 1964 contrasts unfavorably
with the trend in Western Europe and Japan.

Under these cir

cumstances, a permanent increase in exports from b percent to
b.3 percent of the gross national product could prove difficult.
While exports, labor, and prices have grown, imports
have also increased.

Although imports ordinarily tend to check

inflationary forces, a significant increase such as that in 1968
has the effect of virtually obliterating the otherwise impres
sive surplus without curbing domestic inflation.^

The un

answered question in this situation is how much of the import
increase was due to full employment and higher incomes.
a context, the result might not be interpreted dismally.

In such
In

relation to the balance of payments, however, the result was
detrimental, for it was added to other domestic problems such

’Through November of 1968, exports had reached $33.7
billion which was 9 percent above 1967Ts total. However, imports
totaled $32.7 billion, which was 22 percent above the 1967 total.
For complete statistical discussion, see U.S., Congress, The
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, The Balance of
Payments (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969).
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as threatened and actual strikes and other work stoppages.

The

concurrent rise in imports, therefore, was a setback to the
broad, experimental policies applied by the Johnson Administra
tion to curtail the deficit.
While the measures applied were innovative and the re
sult of much deliberation, they were extremely unpopular with
certain groups.

Opposition to certain measures has arisen from

either academics, economists, bankers, or businessmen, and,
occasionally, from all four.

Despite this unpopularity, however,

credit for success must be given.

As the Chairman of the Joint

Economic Committee, the Honorable Henry S. Reuss, stated at the
time, it must be "concede/d/ that at least a portion of the re
duction in 1968 in /the/

payments deficit has to be attributed

to these governmental efforts."^

To determine acceptability

as well as effectiveness, these measures should also be con
trasted to the alternatives which might have been applied.
Other measures which might have been applied include
transportation and expenditure taxes for overseas travel and
a revision to the national tax structure.

An Administration

proposal for such a tax on travel outside the Western Hemisphere
was made in 1968, but found little support in Congress.

The

proposal was aimed to offset the travel deficit in the balance
of payments.
17

This deficit in 1967 was $2.1 billion, with no7
1

U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Balance-ofPayments Policies, Hearings, before a subcommittee on Interna
tional Exchange and Payments, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, p. 1.
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improvement expected.

By 1975, a travel deficit in excess of

$R billion has been projected.18

Consequently, President

Johnson recommended a remedy in the form of reduced American
travel abroad either by voluntary restraint or by legislation.
This action was to be coupled with adequate appropriations for
attracting foreign travel to the United States.

Although the

proposal had as its goal a $500 million reduction rather than
elimination of the total travel deficit, adoption was not
favored in Congress.

In December of 1968, the need for adequate

budgetary funds to stimulate foreign travel in the United States
was again stressed by the Administration.

19

Funding for such

purposes, however, has not received the necessary priority
status.
Another possibility for improving the balance of payments
is through revision of the country’s tax structure.

Certain

European countries recently have made changes in their tax struc
ture which have been of benefit to them in this same endeavor,
but the main emphasis of the United States has been upon in
creasing exports.

The advantage of a tax revision is that im

mediate results may be elicited, and timeliness has been a major
concern of those attempting to correct the American deficit.

D.C.:

18U.S., Department of Commerce, Reports (Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1968), p. U8.

1^U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Letter from
Secretary Fowler, Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Balance
of Payments, December .17, 1968, A Review of Balance ol Payments
Polj cles, p. (I9.
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Although the effect of the "Kennedy Round" agreements
should increase both exports and imports, the major thrust is
not expected to occur until 1972.

Beyond that, an additional

five years may be necessary to achieve the full effect.

In the

meantime, exporters still face, in addition to regular tariff
duties, a variety of measures which inhibit full access to
foreign markets.

Therefore, some measures have been sought to

reduce the barriers thus erected.

Consideration will therefore

be given to these proposals.
Simple changes duplicating those made in Western Euro
pean countries, however, are not considered possible.

Tradi

tionally, the United States has favored a system which relies
heavily upon direct taxation.

Consequently, American indirect

taxes are considerably lower than those imposed by the Western
European countries.

Furthermore, according to former Assistant

Secretary of the Treasury Stanley S. Surrey, the United States
ranks near the bottom of the industrialized countries of the
world as far as the amount of taxes collected relates to gross
national product.^
Modification of the present American tax structure
could, however, raise the amount of taxes collected and possibly
reorient business toward foreign markets to some degree.

This

could be done by instituting a national excise tax with rebates0
2
20
,
U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Tax ation, Digest of Oral Testimony Presented to the Committee
on Ways and Means with Respect to the Administr;rtionTs Balnnccof-Payments Proposals, p. 38.
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and border taxes such as West Germany and France use.

Through

general theory and international practice, such a levy shifts
the tax forward in the price of the item or commodity.

There

fore, an indirect or hidden income tax is levied which is not
reflected as such.
While the use of the excise tax is an acceptable uni
lateral action which many nations use, it seems to have little
support in the United States.

Those opposed to the application

of a national excise tax view it as administratively cumbersome
and less equitable than present practice.

Therefore, the con

sequences of molding domestic tax structure to accommodate
international trade considerations have appeared unrealistic
as long as other means are available to achieve the same or
s imil ar obj e ctive s .
Rather, suggestions have been made for revision of the
present General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules.
Under these rules, countries afflicted by balance-of-payments
difficulties may achieve temporary relief through quota
restrictions.
basis.

Such restrictions may be applied on a multilateral

However, the use of such quota restrictions carries the

implicit threat of retaliation which may set off a spiral of
restrictions resulting in a trade war.

This threat appeared to

be imminent in the 1970 drive in Congress to pass protectionist
trade legislation against Japanese textile imports.

Such ac

tion was averted by a conditional, three-year agreement by the
Japanese industry to impose voluntary quotas.
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Theoretically, therefore, a number of possibilities exist
for improving the balance-of-payments problem through export ex
pansion.

Choosing the best alternative involves a delicate bal

ancing of interests, domestically and internationally, and even
the best alternative may result in unforeseen repercussions.
To complicate the situation further, accurate analysis of re
sults is hampered by a variety of statistical methods which may
be used to compute the balance.

Each of these several methods

emphasizes one particular aspect of the balance-of-payments position and, therefore, yields different results.

21

Not only do methods of statistical analysis differ within
the country, but also among countries.

A lack of international

uniformity in accounting plus a substantial difference in the
quality of statistics among different countries and among the
types of transactions which affect them individually, lead to
the conclusion that "no simple number can adequately describe
the international payments position of /the United States/ at
22
any time."
The balance-of-payments position of the United
States, therefore, is, among other things, relative to the
selected statistics.

This relativity virtually insures rein

forcement of diversified opinion.2
*
pi

U.S., General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress
of the United States, Observations on the United States Balance
of Payments Position (Washington, D.C.: The Comptroller,
General, 19G7), p. 2.
22

U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Balanceof-Paymcnts Statistics of the United States (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 19G5) , p. 2.
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The one balance-of-payments assumption over which there
is little controversy is the identity of the key factors in the
equation.

Despite the confusion over statistical analysis and

interpretation, merchandise trade must be indisputably recog
nized as a crucial factor.

Consequently, since 1958, when the

gravity of the balance-of-payments situation was first con
fronted, corrective measures have concentrated heavily upon
foreign trade expansion.

This has been demonstrated by the

proposals and policies of both the Kennedy and Johnson Adminis
trations.

Relying solely upon an aggressive foreign trade ex

pansion program, however, is ineffective unless coupled with
supporting domestic import policies.
Domestically, efforts have been made to control infla
tion, with one of the key battles being fought against the
United States steel industry.

It is interesting to note that

within the same decade that the steel industry so strongly
opposed Government interference in regard to price increases,
the industry has also appealed for Government intervention and
protection against steel imports.

Indeed, the plight of the

steel industry seems to epitomize the American balance-ofpayments problem in relation to trade.
Wage disputes and the 1959 steel strike sparked a rise
of foreign participation in the United States steel markets in
the 1960Ts.

In each subsequent threat of labor-management

difficulties, this trend has been accelerated.

Furthermore,

the increased inflow of steel imports which began in .1959 was
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paralleled by the outflow of grants and loans used to create
steel mills in underdeveloped countries.

Moreover, in the

postwar period, the United States and various international
agencies^ have advanced a total of $2,165 billion from 1947
through 1966, and an additional $900 million has been provided
by the U.S.S.R., for the construction of steel-producing facilities worldwide.

Some of the American funds to the under

developed areas may have been granted to prevent the U.S.S.R.
from doing so.

For whatever reason, the effect has been that

the American steel industry has not maintained its competitive
ness domestically because of higher prices; in foreign markets,
it has suffered because of nontariff barriers and preferential
treatment granted to members of trading blocs; and, finally,
the proliferation of steel plants has helped to create a world
surplus of steel products.
Consequently, future markets which would have existed in
the developing countries have already been reduced for the tra
ditional steel-exporting countries.

To illustrate, the United

States share of world steel production has decreased from 61
percent in 1945 to 26 percent in 1966, and, by 1975, is expected3
2
23

These include the Export Import Bank of Washington,
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank), Inter-American Development Bank, the International Finance
Corporation, and, the Agency for International Development.
^!'u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Steel
Imports, 90th Cong., 1st sess. , 1967, p. 31.
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to have fallen to 21 percent.

This is not to indicate that

total domestic production has decreased.

Rather, international

steel production has increased while the competitive position of
American steel products in world markets has decreased.

The

factors of lowered competitiveness because of inflation, loss of
former export markets, overcapacity problems, trading blocs, and
new and cheaper substitutes are responsible for this deteriora
tion.
This deterioration has become an increasingly adverse
factor in the balance-of-payments deficit.

Of the $2 billion

deficit in 1966, steel products represented $0.9 billion.

26

This is not to imply, however, that if the steel deficit were
corrected the balance-of-payments deficit would be improved to
the same extent.

While restoration of a net export balance

in steel trade is desirable, the cost of achieving this must
also be counted.

Should that balance be achieved through a

sharp cutback in steel imports which would result in an equiv
alent amount of dollar exports because of retaliation, the bal
ance of payments obviously would not be improved.
What this situation of the American steel industry does
indicate, however, is that there is a necessity for establishing
priorities as well as for balancing interests.

Further, it re

veals the sometimes contradictory policies originated, within

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Steel
Imports, p. 82.
26

II)id., p . 81 .

the
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same Government, the tension between foreign and domestic econ
omic policy, and the political reverberations of the balance-ofpayments choices.

It also suggests the impossibility of easy

or quick resolutions because of the variety and magnitude of
competing choices and interests often embodied in the same
decisions.
The case of the United States steel industry, therefore,
demonstrates the connection between foreign and domestic policy
decisions.

Segregation of the two areas appears impossible.

Neither policies decided by industry nor by Government can be
implemented in a vacuum.

Just as the steel industry has suffered

because of international conditions partly brought about by its
own policies, so also may the Government’s balance-of-payments
policies be crippled by internal conditions and its trade ex
pansion program be limited.
To be really effective, an aggressive export expansion
program presupposes some degree of reciprocity.

Such recipro

city may, of course, virtually eliminate any gains in export
expansion such as occurred in 1968.

Nevertheless, the trend in

the United States, particularly in the 1960Ts, has been toward
increased liberalization of trade, which tacitly accepts import
expansion.

The development of this trend is reflected in the

legislative history regarding trade matters.
The Trade Agreements Act of 193M has served as the
cornerstone of American commercial policy for almost MO years.
Originated during the Roosevelt Administration as an anti-

90

Depression measure designed to open new export markets for
American products, it lias continued through the postwar years
with a number of extensions.

American participation in both

the GATT and "Kennedy Round” bargaining has been derived from
27
this earlier legislation.
Extensions of this legislation in the 1950Ts produced an
inherent contradiction.

On one hand, the legislation had en

couraged continued multilateral tariff reductions on American
imports.

On the other hand, certain provisions of the Act off

set this liberalization trend.

For instance, the "no injury"

philosophy was incorporated in the national security provisions,
peril point, and escape clauses of the Act.

This philosophy

allowed for trade expansion through liberalization only so long
as domestic industry was not adversely affected.
Under such provisions, an industry, very narrowly de
fined, could claim serious injury based solely on a decline in
its particular share of the market, despite industry’s overall
condition.

In other words, while Industrial production and em

ployment might have been increasing, a very small segment claim
ing injury could theoretically bring about tariff increases,
should its claims be accepted by the Tariff Commission and the
President.

Until 1958, the President hod final decision-making

authority over Tariff Commission recommendations.

At that time,7
2

27Mordechoi E. Kreinin, Alternative Commercial Policies-Their Effect on the American Economy (East Lansing, Michigan:
Michigan State University International Business and Economic
Studies, 1967), p. 15.
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however, an extension to the Act stipulated that a two-thirds
majority of both Houses of Congress could override the Presi
dent’s decision.

As part of the same extension, the President

was authorized to offer increased concessions.

28

This latter option of granting concessions has been
utilized to a far greater extent than the escape clause or other
provisions.

29

Perhaps more significant than usage of these

provisions, however, was the inhibitive effect of their exis
tence.

In essence, their purpose was incompatible with eco

nomic goals despite their limited usage.

Consequently, a rec

onciliation of these incompatible objectives was begun in the
1962 extension.

By the inclusion of a trade adjustment program

in that extension, a shift in emphasis seems to be denoted.

This

shift was from protection of domestic products against import
competition to provision for assistance in various forms, (e.g.,
low-interest loans, aid in research, market information), to
enable a transfer to more competitive market areas.

This change

in emphasis has been further noted in the continuation of the
’’Kennedy Round” negotiations.8
2
28

Passage of this legislation followed extensive hearings.
See U.S., Congress, House, Renewal of Trade Agreements Act,
Hearings, before the Committee on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 2nd
sess. , 1958 and U.S., Congress, Senate, Trade Agreements Act
Extension., Hearings, before the Committee on Finance, 85th Cong.,
2nd sess., 1958.
2Q
A thorough discussion of this point is contained in
Irving Kravis, "Trade Agreement Escape Clause,” American Economic
Review, XLIV (June, 195M), pp. 319-38.
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A number of interpretations of the post-World War II
trend toward trade liberalization have been offered.

Whatever

motivation or combination of motives is used to explain this
trend, the same elements are present while only the emphasis is
changed.

Emerging from World War II as a world power politi

cally, economically, and militarily, the United States has
attempted to maintain this position through a number of political
alliances guaranteed by military force.

Consequently, it has

been argued that political or military rather than economic
considerations have determined American commercial policy during
qn
much of the postwar period. u

This contention is supported by American support of or
ganizations such as the European Economic Community (EEC), which
would affect American exports unfavorably, especially agricul
tural products.

Furthermore, American bargaining power would be

reduced in international economic negotiations.

These consid

erations, however, were overshadowed by the political advantages
of a strong Western Europe in Cold War politics.

This viewpoint

interprets American advocacy of the United Kingdom’s entry into
the EEC as a desire to both strengthen the organization and
America’s influence on it.

American opposition to the creation

of an all-European Free Trade Area (EFTA) as well as to the
entry of neutral countries such as Sweden, Austria, and*

^This argument is presented by Bela Balassa, Trade
Liborali/at ion in Industrial Countries: Objectives and Alternat:ivos (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1905 ) .
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Switzerland into the EEC demonstrated the same point.

Without

political advantages, trading blocs held little American interest.
This attitude seems to have changed in the 1960Ts, when
economic considerations began to equal political ones with the
continuing balance-of-payments problem.

This transformation of

United States policies is attributed to the increasing political
strength of the EEC and the erosion of American leadership among
Western European nations.

32

The EEC has developed into a strong

bargaining force in GATT negotiations whose market policies cer
tainly affect American exports.

Therefore, the trend of in

creased trade liberalization in American economic policy, partic
ularly during the 1960’s, seems to be the result of political as
well as economic necessity.
In contrast, another key factor in the balance-of-payments
equation has moved in the opposite direction.

If foreign trade

continues to increase and its attendant legislation has become
more liberalized, foreign aid has experienced a setback through
Congressional reductions of requested funds and restrictions in
legislation.

The observation has been made that acceptance and

support of foreign policy by the American people is prefigured
by a commitment to moral principle and by a belief that national1
3

31Kr einin, Alternative Commercial Polleles--Thelr Effect
on the American Economy, pp. 12-13.
32

Ibid., p. 19.

security interests are at stake.

33

Both these elements were

present in the initiation of the foreign aid program.

National

security interests concerned the phenomenal spread of Communism
in Europe and Asia in the early postwar period.

Between 19M5 and

1950, the spread of Communism subjugated some 19 nations covering
over 5 million square miles and including more than 700 million
people.

O

(I

In addition, the Soviet Union and Communist China

came to control the world’s largest collection of men and arms,
while also possessing nuclear weapons as well as large quantities
of raw materials.

The second concern, or commitment to moral

principle, related to the ideals and freedoms embodied in the
American Constitution.

These have been assured by the economic
*3 C

success of the world’s highest per capita nation. 3

Dedication

to these principles and their preservation, as supplemented by
economic experience has justified a foreign aid program.
Since its initiation, however, a modification of attitude
seems to have occurred.

While the foreign aid program has not

been terminated nor has a date for termination been projected,
the intensity of commitment to a long-range involvement seems to
have diminished.

Initially the product of political and military

concerns, foreign aid in the 1960’s felt the impact of economic
33
Walter W. Rostow, quoted in Robert W. Tucker, Nation
or Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 16.

N.J.:

3'lLloyd D. Black, The Strategy of Foreign Aid (Princeton,
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968), p. 15.
1’Ibid, pp. 20-21.
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repercussions.

Concurrently, the program in its entirety has

been brought into question.
This modification of attitude is best demonstrated by
briefly tracing the legislative history of foreign aid.

The

foreign aid program may be traced as far back as 1938 to the
Department of State’s educational exchange program with Latin
America, in some respects the forerunner of the Alliance for
Progress.

Following this was the pre-World War II enactment of

the Lend Lease Act which provided assistance to potential allies.
After the war, relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and re
covery took precedence, and the International Bank for Recon
struction and Development was established in 1999-, the Marshall
Plan was begun in 1997, and the British and French Government
QC
aid organizations were set up in 199-6.
With the diminished armies of the United States and
Western Europe and the growing awareness of the Russian menace,
aid to Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan gave rise to the
Truman Doctrine, which was later expanded to include Korea and
other peripheral areas of China.

In 1999, the North Atlantic

Treaty was signed and the Mutual Defense Assistance program was
passed by Congress.

This legislation authorized assistance for

the collective security agreements, such as the Rio Pact, NATO,
SEATO, and other bilateral treaties.

Subsequently, special eco

nomic aid programs were applied to Yugoslavia, Jordan, India,
Spain, and to Arab and Israeli refugees.
36,Friedmann. International F inancial A i d , p. 2.
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The technical cooperation program, commonly known as
"Point Four” , was also introduced in 1949, and was passed by
Congress in 1950 as the Act for International Development,
Title IV of Public Law 535.

One interesting aspect of this Act

was that it stressed the importance of private investment abroad
and the creation of a favorable climate for such investment.
Failure to achieve this has had an effect on the balance-ofpayments problem, and is frequently mentioned as one means of
improving that situation.
Following the initial appropriations of $39.5 million
for fiscal year 1951 and $159.5 million for fiscal year 1952
under "Point Four,"^ the Korean War sparked a renewed effort
for strengthening all fronts.

The result was passage of the

1951 Mutual Security Act which consolidated the European Co
operation Administration, the Mutual Assistance Defense Program,
and "Point Four" efforts.

As a result, the former emphasis on

the building of economic strength by the European Cooperation
Administration was shifted to defense support under the Mutual
Security Act.
During the 1950Ts, other instruments for administration
were created.

The most important and enduring one, however,

was the Agency for International Development (AID), created by
the Foreign Aid Assistance Act of 1961.

Both the Agency and the

Act continued to control the foreign aid program throughout the
1960’s.

J‘

B1 nek, The Strategy of Foreign Aid, p . 6.
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Since its beginning, therefore, foreign aid has under
gone a series of changes.

Beginning with victory in war, it has

passed through reconstruction and economic recovery, to defense
support and military aid, and, finally, to long-range economic
development.

This latter development has been reinforced by the

creation of international agencies and special United Nations
p r o g r a m s . S i g n i f i c a n c e at the national level is attested to
by the more than $100 billion made available for foreign aid
programs between 1958 and 1968.^
Although it has been the leading contributor in inter
national efforts through the mechanisms of the United Nations,
the United States has preferred bilateral foreign aid programs.
This preference has been explained on the basis of self-interest
and security considerations.

As a matter of self-interest, the

United States has not participated solely in a multilateral
program administered by an international mechanism because its
role would be both obscured and minimized.

Under such a plan,

the influence of the donor country would be undercut in the
actual administration of the program and in the decision-making
process within the United Nations.

This is true since relatively

few countries participate in aid programs, and the United States3
38
These special programs include designation of the
1900’s as the "Decade of Development" and 19G5 as International
Cooperation Year, the World Food Program and Freedom from Hunger
Campaign, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
and population conferences.
^Black, The Strategy of Foreign Aid, p. 13.
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is foremost among them.

Consequently, the viewpoints and

attitudes of the recipient countries would far outweigh those
of the donor countries.

Furthermore, all member countries of

the United Nations would participate in policy determination.
This could present a security threat for included among these
would be Iron Curtain countries, neutrals, and other uncommitted
areas.

Such circumstances would most likely bring about re

gional log rolling and could reduce overall effectiveness and
hamper program objectives.

In addition, the possibility of a
90
Soviet veto would be of continuous concern.
For these reasons,
the decision as to how and for what purposes foreign aid would

be allocated has been retained at the national level.
This preference, therefore, seems to be the result of
the political considerations at the base of the program.

Begun

as a blend of Cold War strategy and humanitarian sentiment,
direct control was placed under domestic rather than interna
tional authority.

The title of the 1999 program, the Mutual

Security Administration, which raised foreign aid to the level
of foreign policy, hinted at the direction foreign aid would take
Through the 1950Ts, foreign aid seems to have been di
rected toward short-range Cold War objectives, with develop
ment playing a supporting role.

Zealous presentations to Con

gress were phrased to fan the anti-Communist fervor of the time.
90

Morris Watnick, "The Appeal of Communism to the Under
developed Peoples," The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas, ed. by
Berthold F. Iloselitz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1952), p. 201.
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Primary emphasis, therefore, seems to have been on stopping the
spread of Communism, rather than promoting economic development.
Consequently, military aid appears to have been primary during
that period.

Since the two forms of aid were not separated,

difficulty has been encountered in distinguishing between them.
In spite of this difficulty, a few analysts have suc
ceeded in separating the two forms of aid.

Among them is John

Nuveen, who has made an analysis of foreign assistance from
July of 1995 through March of 1961.

His findings indicate that

of the total appropriations granted to developing countries
($39.3 billion), $27.1 billion was spent on military assistance
and defense support, while another $1.9 billion was used for
administration, international agencies, and miscellaneous
items.^

Therefore, the conclusion drawn is that criticisms

alleging excessive waste and poor results should not be attri
buted solely to economic development programs, which, until the
19607s, represented a very small percentage of the entire pro
gram.

Nevertheless, it would seem that critics of the foreign

aid program have bolstered their case by citing total aid
appropriations rather than the percentage actually used for
development purposes.
Criticism has gained momentum through such allegations
as waste,, inefficiency, and lack of accomplishment, but perhaps

'"\john Nuveen, quoted in Friedmann, International
Financial Aid, p. 385.
Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign A id, pp. 7-8.

1G0
more important is the reduced threat posed by the Soviet Union
in relation to the Third World.

While justification for mili

tary defense support rested upon the Soviet menace, likewise
economic development assistance has cited Russia as its cause.
In an historical sense, "if the Soviet experience teaches any
thing, it is that it demonstrates ad oculos the formidable dan
gers inherent in our time in the existence of economic backwardness."

Therefore, with Russia as both an object lesson and a

threat, the conclusion was drawn that advanced countries could
not afford to be indifferent to economic backwardness.

It was

thought to be in their best interest to provide assistance which,
in turn, would produce the dividends of world stability and pros
perity.

Unfortunately, however, the attitude has been developing

that although the assistance has been provided, the profits have
not accrued.

The dilemma, then, is seen as the tension between

long-range objectives and short-term investments.
The fact that in the postwar era all the serious threats
to world peace, with the exceptions of Berlin and Czechoslovakia,
have originated in the Third World has supported arguments favor1+1+
ing this economic assistance.
The shift in emphasis began in
L)3
Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in
Historical Perspective," in The Progress of Underdeveloped
Areas, ed. by Berthold F. Hoselitz (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1952), p. 29.
1|L*Henry Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign
Policy," Agenda for the Nation, ed. by Kermit Gordon (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institute, 19G8), p. GG3.
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1957, and by fiscal year 1969 almost 80 percent of the economic
aid funds were directed toward economic development.11'’ More
over, the verbal willingness of the Soviet bloc not only to
participate in bilateral aid programs but to significantly in
crease trade with the developing countries further strengthened
the American commitment in the 1950Ts and early 1960’s.
However, this intention has not been fulfilled.

Two

reports demonstrate this, one prepared by Soviet market re
searchers and one prepared by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development.

Both reveal greater amounts and superior

programs of Western economic aid over that of the Eastern bloc,
and a comparison between the areas regarding trade shows that
the West accounted for 90 percent and the Eastern bloc for about
10 percent.+D

Moreover, the Soviet bloc has not substantially

increased its trade with the developing countries in the period
from 1963 through 1967.

This factor largely undercut the threat

of the Soviet prediction of doubling such trade by 1970.

97

Fur

thermore, Soviet loans to the underdeveloped areas are used to
pay for equipment and materials purchased in the Soviet bloc.
Between 1959 and mid-1969, Eastern bloc aid amounted only to

■’Friedmann, International Financial Aid, p. 386.
'^JKurt Muller, The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet
Bloc and Communist China, trans. by Richard H. Weber and Michael
Roloff (N.Y.: Walker and Company, 1967), p. 193.
'l7Ib:id. , p. 196.
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about $6 billion,1'^ an amount considerably below that of American
expenditures.

In combination, these elements have served to

minimize the Communist threat and competition for influence in
the underdeveloped countries through trade and aid measures in
the 1960's.
With the diminished threat of Communist global expan
sion, emphasis shifted to long-term development assistance.
However, in the meantime, other political and economic concerns
had emerged.

Since 1950, a deficit had existed in the balance

of payments.

Lack of immediate confrontation took into account

the 1999 currency devaluations, the Korean War, the sharp rise
of military expenditures abroad, and the fall in exports in
1953.

By this time, Western Europe was beginning to meet its

domestic needs and the end of the Korean boom was being felt in
the non-industrial countries.
Furthermore, a new pattern was set in 1953, which was
also an election year.

The Administration proposed $7.9 billion

for foreign assistance funds, which was less than the $8.5 bil
lion requested in 1952 but more than the $7.3 billion that Con
gress had appropriated.1^

Therefore, the precedent was set

M8

Muller, The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc
and Communist China, p. 219.
99

Andrew Westwood, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy
Framework (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1966),
p. 37.
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whereby the Administration could both claim a reduction and con
currently request an increase.50

Moreover, while these reduc

tions were largely made in military assistance funds for NATO,
military assistance funds for Asia were increased.

The purpose

of this increase was to give relief to Korea and to defray French
costs in Indochina.
The downward trend in Congressional appropriations con
tinued until 195M-, when a Democratic Congress approved $7.5 bil
lion out of $7.5 billion requested, which was considered a vic
tory for the Administration.50- Concurrently, the Administration
proposed funds be made available for a three-year period to
finance economic development projects in Asia.

Breaking with the

past procedure of authorizing temporary aid on a yearly basis,
Congress accepted the proposal of a three-year Development Loan
Fund.

However, in 1957, this was reduced to two years and,

when a similar authorization for military assistance was sought,
it was denied until 1960.
With the shift in emphasis to long-term development, a
stabilizing effect seems to have taken place in funding.

For

1957, 1958, and 1959, Administration proposals requested $3.95
*

50For illustration, see U.S., Congress, Senate, Com
parison of Budget Requests and Appropriations for the Aid Pro
gram, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th
Cong., 2nd sess., 196b, p. b72.
5 1Westwood, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework,
p. 58.
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billion, while the appropriations were slightly l o w e r . D u r i n g
this period, however, expansion of funds for development lending
did not have strong support because of the deepening concern over
the balance-of-payments deficit.

Although the Suez crisis pro

vided a $500 million surplus in 1957, this was the only surplus
since 1999.

Recognition occurred with the $3.5 billion deficit

of 1958, $3.7 billion of 1959, and $3.9 billion of 1960.

After

this, the amount declined somewhat to $2.9 billion in 1961 and
$2.2 billion in 1962.-^

At that time, from 1958 through 1960,

however, neither Congress nor the Administration seem to have
wanted greater emphasis placed on long-term foreign aid expendi
tures and, consequently, development lending outside the foreign
aid program was emphasized.

This has been done in conjunction

with the "tied-aid” concept introduced in 1959.
In 1960, Congress authorized long-term military assis
tance.

By this action, annual military funding would need ap

proval but the legislation would be continuous.

Also in 1960,

the United States made the proposal that a Development Assistance
Group become a part of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, which subsequently became the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

52U.S.f President, Foreign Aid Message of March 22, 1961
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961),
53

U.S., President, Special Message on the Balance of
Payments (Washington, D.C.r Government Printing Office, 1963),
p. 2.
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This group was not intended to be a fund or source of economic
aid, but rather a consultative and coordinative body.

Its over

all effect seems to have been as a pressure group for increasing
foreign aid funds.
New legislation, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, re
placed the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and a reorganization of
the aid agency took place.

It has since been called the Agency

for International Development.

This action was taken to present

a "new look" to the foreign aid p r o g r a m . T h e substantive
change was concentration upon long-term development lending to
coincide with the United Nations "Decade of Development."

In

addition, the Administration stated that aid for crisis situa
tions, such as Vietnam, would have to continue until resolved
and also requested a crash Latin American aid bill.~^
Ineffectiveness of the reorganization, recurrence of
familiar problems, plus the pressure of a persistent balance-ofpayments problem, may account for the 1962 reduction in foreign
aid.

This action prefigured subsequent cuts and reflected the

growing difference between Congressional authorization and Ad
ministration requests for foreign aid appropriations.

For fiscal

year 1963, the Administration's foreign aid requests were reduced
59

U.S., President, Foreign Aid Message of March 22, 1961,

p. b.
"’"’u.S. , President, Budget of the United States Govern
ment FY 1962: Budget Message and Summary Budget Statement
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1-5.
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by 25 percent, or $1,12|4 million, by Congress/

The following

year, partly as a result of the Clay Committee findings (see
p. 62), Administration requests for fiscal year I960 were reduced
from $l+.5 billion to $3.6 billion.^
These reductions were indicative of the trend for the
remainder of the decade.

Through the second half of the 1960’s,

foreign aid expenditures have not received the priority status
of their earlier years.

On one hand, the volume for development

has leveled off rather than increased in proportion to either
the American gross national product or the estimated needs of
the recipient countries.

On the other hand, the costs of ad

ministering the program have risen.

Furthermore, Congressional

debates seem to have become more bitter and divisive and have
resulted in such measures as ceilings on the number of countries
receiving certain kinds of aid, eligibility restrictions, and
loans replacing grants on a large scale.

For instance, from

1953 through 1955, loans represented 6 percent of the total aid
assistance; from 1959 through 1961, 36 percent; and, in 1965,
60 percent of the total assistance to all countries other than
Vietnam was in the form of loans.

58

U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1963, Hearings, before the Committee
on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, p. 733.
57U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1969, Hearings, before the Committee
on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 289.
58

Agency for International Development, Summary Report
on Loan Terms, Debt burden, and Development (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 2.
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Furthermore, loan terms have hardened and "tied aid"
requirements are extensively used.

Moreover, the share of aid

funds devoted to Vietnam has overshadowed and undercut the amount
devoted to the remainder of the underdeveloped countries.

On an

international level, the amount of aid contributed through inter
national agencies rose slightly.

However, the American bilateral

program continued to be unmatched by any other nation.
While the American program has continued to lead all
foreign aid programs, continuity is also seen in the criticism
generated within the country.

Although its advocates have accen

tuated positive effects, the adversaries of the foreign aid pro
gram have found much to discredit.

Among the continuing criti

cisms is the effect on the balance of payments.

The similarity

between the amount of the deficit and foreign aid appropriations
is striking.

Again, however, conclusions relate to the particular

statistics chosen.

In any case, a relationship does exist and

more often than not it has been described as detrimental in an
economic sense.
Spokesmen for the foreign aid program, on the other hand,
have offered a different interpretation.

In relation to the

largest single foreign aid expenditure, to Vietnam, President
Johnson conceded that a cessation of the fighting would reduce
the approximate $1.5 billion annual exchange costs and help the
balance-of-payments problem.

However, he also stressed that

"America had a balance-of-payments problem before Vietnam and
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cessation of the fighting will not in and of itself effect a
59
cure."
While it should free funds for other international
areas or for domestic programs, several years may be required
60
to accomplish this diversion of funds.
In a similar vein, the argument has been made by AID’s
Administrator, Mr. William S. Gaud, that AIDTs contribution to
61
the dollar drain in mid-1968 "had been cut to nothing."
At
the same time, however, so had its contribution to international
trade expansion.

The Agency’s claim of a reduction to the

dollar drain was based on a comparison between fiscal year 1961,
when AID’s overseas expenditures totaled $982 million, and fiscal
year 1968, when this outflow was $178 million.

Interest and pay

ments on previous loans totaling $259 million offset this outflow and resulted in a net inflow of $81 million.

6 2

Despite inter

national trade expansion considerations, the reduced outflow of
funds might have been significant.

It is indeed unfortunate that

this occurred the same year that President Johnson’s export ex
pansion gains were obliterated by the large import increase.6
*
59

President Lyndon Johnson, quoted in U.S., Treasury Department, Maintaining the Strength of the United States Dollar in
a Strong Free World Economy (Washington, D.C.: Government Print
ing Office, 1968), p. 2.
60

Charles L. Schultze, "Budget Alternatives after Vietnam,"
in Agenda for the Nation, ed. by Kermit Gordon (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institute, 1968), p. 38.
61
William S. Gaud, quoted in U.S., Congress, Joint Eco
nomic Committee, Foreign Aid hearings, before the subcommittee on
International Exchange and Payments, 91st Cong., 1st sess.,
1968, p. i|.
b2Ibid., p. 5.
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Nevertheless, the AID program claims to have moved from
a negative to a positive impact on the American balance of pay
ments, and to take credit for "stanching the direct outflow in
any given year is the tying of procurement to United States
sources."

63

Thus, the continuation of "tied aid" for balance-

of-payments reasons has strong justification despite its seem
ingly unjust effect on recipient countries, i.e., while relieving
American balance-of-payments problems, it offers no corres
ponding relief for the balance-of-payments problems in the re
cipient countries.
While the Agency anticipates an increase in the inflow
of funds in the future, others suggest the increasing difficulty
of the developing countries to make such payments.

Although it

varies among countries, this growing debt burden is cited as a
6b
real problem for the 1970’s.
Moreover, these countries as an
aggregate are unable to finance large deficits for more than a
few years because of an insufficient share of the world’s re
serves.

Neither are they able to earn surpluses consistently,

because expansionary desires result in their spending virtually
6S
all their foreign exchange in foreign markets.
Therefore,
their balance-of-payments problems are at least as critical as
those of the United States.

^Westwood, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework,
p. 205.
64
65
p. 25.

Ibid., p. 112.
Sa1ant, The United States Balance of Payments In 1968,

no
With the critical economic situation in the developing
countries, the need for additional funds from donor countries
has been advocated.

However, the downward trend in Congressional

allocation, plus the uncertainty of commitment to a long-range
American program, has caused another shift in emphasis.
shift is toward private investment.

This

While measures have been

implemented to reduce capital outflow, notably during the Johnson
Administration, they were not intended to apply to the developing
countries.^
coincided.

However, intention and outcome seem not to have
Therefore, steps have been taken during the Nixon

Administration to alleviate these restrictions.

Furthermore,

a continuing commitment to long-range foreign aid has been
affirmed by the Nixon Administration, relying upon moral, eco
nomic, and national security considerations.
In presenting the fiscal year 1970 economic and military
assistance program, Mr. Nixon is quoted as saying,
This Administration believes that we have moved well beyond
the time when the concept of assistance could be related to
short-term U.S. policy and security interests. Such a view
misrepresents the nature of the current effort. '
This commitment has been reflected in foreign aid requests to6

60
Agency for International Development, Foreign Aid
Through Private Initiateve: A Report of the Advisory Committee
on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid (Washington, D.C.: Govern
ment Printing Office, 1965), pp. 27-28.
G7
President Richard M. Nixon, quoted in "Foreign Aid and
the United States National Interests," Department of State
Dulietin, June 30, 1969, p. 1.
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Congress

fo

with emphasis on private enterprise, technical assis

tance measures, and multilateral cooperation.^
Moreover, in making the earlier 1968 appropriations,
which were the smallest since the program began, Congress had
asked for a reappraisal of foreign assistance programs along
with recommendations for reform and reorganization.

The Nixon

Administration has consequently created the position of Auditor
General to assure proper usage of AID funds.

Therefore, indica

tions are that the foreign aid program, despite fluctuations,
reductions, and severe criticism, is enduring.
Along this same line, the Nixon Administration is moving
toward a further reorganization of the foreign aid program.

The

technical assistance programs, which total about $270 million
annually, are expected to be placed under international agencies
or private contractors insofar as possible.^

This move toward

increased reliance on multilateral agencies and the private
sector at the implementation stage is in line with the Adminis
tration's previously announced policy.

Reorganization of the

foreign aid program as proposed by the Nixon Administration

k^The appropriations requested for FY 1970 were $2.2 bil
lion for economic assistance, $375 million for military assis
tance, and $75 million for guaranteed reserves, most of which are
in the form of repayable loans.
^Robert E. Asher, Development Assistance in the 70's:
Alternatives for the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institute, 1970), p. 2.
^Bernard D. Nossiter, "U.S. Moves to Reduce AID Role
Overseas," Washington Post, March 30, 1971, p. 1.
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includes replacing AID by three new agencies, one to handle the
development loan program, one for military assistance, and one
for technical aid./J- The question which remains to be settled
is whether this reduction in supervision and influence, although
relatively small, will be accepted.
Acceptance of a reduced American role has likewise been
a problem in reaching agreement in international monetary reform
negotiations.

These negotiations have been necessary because

the American dollar crisis is not solely an American problem.
Beyond 1958, continued American deficits have been interpreted
as a threat to the international monetary order, since they seem
to represent a genuine balance-of-payments disequilibrium.

Con

sequently, the argument is repeatedly made that they can neither
be approved nor sustained.^

a

solution, however, is doubly

difficult because the country having the chronic deficits is,
at the same time, a key-currency country.
The effects of American economic decisions may, there
fore, be felt worldwide, since the United States is a keycurrency country.

For instance, should the United States be

forced by balance-of-payments pressure to either devalue the
dollar or to impose trade and exchange controls, then the inter
national monetary system would be jeopardized.

While this may

■^Nossiter, ”U.S. Moves to Reduce AID Role Overseas,”
Washington Post, March 30, 1971, p. 1.
7n

'Delbert A. Snider, International Monetary Relations
(New York: Random House, 1906), p. 110.
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be a remote possibility from an American viewpoint, nevertheless,
the American balance-of-payments problem has not been effectively
removed through American policy decisions.

Moreover, the prob

lem is multiplied by the dual role in which the United States
has found itself.
Although the dollar crisis of the past decade appears to
have been met by general cooperation among the major governments
of the world and the central banks, this cooperation has resulted
in only short-term agreements.

These agreements have concen

trated upon warding off a collapse of the entire system similar
73
to that which occurred in 1931.
Fear of such a collapse rests
partially upon a contrast between present and previous practices.
In the past, banks attempted to adjust their rates to the par
ticular balance-of-payments situation.

Therefore, international

policies deferred to balance-of-payments equilibrium.

In con

trast, present practice often appears to place primary emphasis
on employment and growth policies.
Disapproval of such practice is based upon fear of de
valuation of the dollar, which could give rise to massive inter
national movements of speculative funds, which, in turn, might
require the creation of special institutions.

79

In short, the

present structure of the monetary system is thought by many to

73

Robert Triffin, Our International Monetary System:
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (New York: Random House, Inc.,
19G8) , p. 57.
714
Fritz Machlup, Plans for Reform of the International
Monetary System (Princeton, N.J.: Pr inceton University, 19Gll) ,
p. 15.
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be far too susceptible to breakdown.

Doubts that the dollar

liability has limits, supplemented by fear of exceeding that
limit, has caused further reluctance to accept dollar supplies.
Certainly, such a breakdown could have manifold conse
quences internationally.

More likely, however, improvisation

could relieve some of the chaos, but, rather than rely on such
a possibility, experts have offered reform proposals to alleviate
the potential problems within the current framework.

Suggested

reforms, however, have elicited some fundamental disagreements.
Different therapies have been advanced regarding the stabiliza
tion of currencies through a reestablishment of convertibility
and by a revaluation of the current gold price.
Along with the numerous proposals, there seem to be at
least as many problems created in the areas of foreign exchange,
governmental and private finance, central and commercial banking,
international organization, and even gold mining and production.
In general, the only point which seems to have claimed a con
sensus of opinion has been the inadequacy of the present system.
While some experts do not agree that reserve creation
has been inadequate in the past, the creation of adequate re
serves for the future is basic to the issue of reform.

In this

respect, there is virtually no support for retention of the
current system among economists and knowledgeable officials.
Criticism relates both to the source of additional gold supplies
on which the system rests, and the method whereby surplus coun
tries have obtained their additional reserves.
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For instance, in the six-year period from 1960 through
1965, two-thirds of the gold purchased in Western markets had
Russia as its source, and three-fourths of the reserve increases
in Western countries were counter-balanced by the deficits in the
two reserve-center countries, the United States and Great
Britain.'7-’ Such a system, it has widely been concluded, is not
only unsafe but irrational.

It is unsafe because it relies on

a latently hostile government to furnish a sizeable amount of its
gold supply,^ and it is irrational because of the inequities it
is producing.

Such conditions foster a lack of confidence in

the overall stability of the system.
Proposed remedies in the 1960Ts, however, have resulted
in sharply divided opinion between those countries which have a
deficit, i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom, and
those which have a surplus, i.e., countries of Continental
Europe, particularly France.

Without discussing the specific

details of American proposals, the United States has generally
favored the creation of a new reserve asset.

However, such an

asset would be used only as a supplement to British pounds and
American dollars should the need arise, i.e., should the usual
methods of using dollars and pounds to offset the shortage
7
'^Triffin, Our International Monetary System, p. 57.
^American antipathy to Russian gold dotes back as far as
1917, when the Bolsheviks took control of the Russian government.
For a discussion of the American State Department ruling against
the acceptance of Russian gold by either the U.S. Mint or assay
offices, see Robert P. Browder, The Origins of Soviet-American
Diplomacy (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953),
pp. 26-6 8.
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between gold assets and actual liquidity requirements fail.
The French counter-proposal has also supported the
creation of a new reserve asset, but one which would replace
rather than merely supplement existing currencies.

At this

point, the disagreement seems to become more political than
economic.

In a 1965 press conference, President Charles

de Gaulle expressed this disagreement when he asked
Why should the two richest countries of the world be allowed
to monopolize the benefits of international reserve creation
for the financing of their own deficits? Why should the
Bank of France be expected to participate--by its purchase
of dollars--in the financing of U.S. policies in which
France has no voice and with which she might be in funda
mental disagreement? Are not United States deficits
ascribable, at least in part, to the flurry of United
States private investments abroad (substituting United
States for French ownership), to United States assistance
to Chiang Kai-shek, to the escalation of the war in Southeast
Asia, and so o n ? ^
Therefore, this opinion would visualize joint decisions being
made for predetermined purposes and, most important, new reserves
being created to replace and not merely supplement those now in
use.

Predictably enough, there was far less than enthusiastic

reception of this proposal among American and British authori
ties.
With the complexity of the problem plus the diversity of
opinion among the authorities as well as the nations, it is not
surprising that comprehensive reform has not yet been achieved.
As recently as 1968, the Conference on International Monetary

77

President Charles de Gaulle, quoted in Triffin, Our
International Monetary System, p. 108.
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Order, one of a number of conferences held during the past few
years, noted that the "world today faces the most serious mone
tary crisis of the postwar period . . .

and concluded that

the major factor in these difficulties is persistent inflation
and the consequent lack of confidence in the currencies."'7^
One of the essential measures suggested was the summarization of
problems and remedies "because much of the discussion of this
subject has been in highly technical and obscure language with
the result that basic issues have not been understood by the
general public."'7^

However, even with wide dissemination of

the information available, it does not seem likely that radical
international innovation would take place.

Indeed, at the

bottom of every argument to end the chronic balance-of-payments
deficits is the issue of domestic inflation, which completes
and closes the circle.

•7g

Conference on International Monetary Order: Agenda
for Action by a Group of Monetary Experts (Geneva: Graduate
Institute of International Studies, 19G8), p. 10.
79 Ibid., p. 10.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In summary, the post-World War II era marks both a
period of decline and of development in the economic affairs of
the United States.

In the trade position of the United States,

a relative decline has occurred.

This phenomenon has been

traced to a variety of causes, including physical or natural,
domestic policy regarding inflation and interest rates, a long
line of historical and legal precedents restricting international
trade relations, and the export of technology.

Concurrently,

the United States has engaged in extensive development activi
ties through its foreign aid program.

Initially intended to

assist Western European recovery, it has subsequently been
broadened to meet the Communist challenge, and, later, to pro
vide assistance for long-range development solely for the sake
of development.
Relating to both trade and aid policies, the American
balance-of-payments problem has become a characteristic of the
postwar era.
three periods.

Within this relationship, it may be divided into
The first, from the close of World War II until

1950, was a political and economic summit for the United States.
With the devastation of Western Europe, America ascended to
reign over the Western world economically, politically and
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militarily, while Russia emerged as the Eastern parallel.

During

this time, the wealth of the Western world flowed into the United
States, production levels could hardly meet international de
mands, and Western solidarity was a political postulate.

The

emergence of the communist threat was met with almost religious
fervor, and the thrust of the response was bolstered by a healthy
and vigorous economy.

This economic utopia allowed the initia

tion of a sizable foreign aid assistance program.

Continuation

of economic eminence seems never to have been doubted in the
past, but continued commitment to long-range foreign assistance
appears doubtful in the future.
With the reconstruction and recovery of Western Europe,
monetary and economic stability followed.

Consequently, 1950

began a new phase during which the ’dollar shortage’ ended and
a redistribution of international reserves resulted in restora
tion of more normal patterns.

This redistribution continued with

the tacit approval of the United States Government for several
years after 1950.

At the same time, foreign aid assistance also

passed through reconstruction and economic recovery.

Rather

than being terminated or reduced when this was accomplished, it
was instead diverted to other areas in the form of defense sup
port and military aid.

This diversion was justified on the basis

of the alarming expansion of Communism between 1995 and 1950.
This interpreted threat to national security and democratic
principles was answered by a substantial outpouring of funds
which was reflected in the balance of payments as a deficit.
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Until 1958, balance-of-payments deficits were a matter
of official sanction.

Beginning with 1958 and the third period,

however, concern became rather widespread regarding the con
tinuation of such a practice.

Not only were continued deficits

posing a threat to the national economy, but also to the inter
national one.

Immediate reduction of these annual deficits

without abandoning the foreign aid program, an element of foreign
policy considered vital by some, has created quite a dilemma.
Despite the fact that a relatively large trade surplus has
existed in the American balance of payments, it has been insuf
ficient to meet the expenses of economic and military assistance
programs.

Consequently, several avenues have been explored in

the hope of alleviating this situation.
Among the attempted remedies have been an expansive ex
port program, restrictions on the outflow of capital through
foreign investments, and the use of the ,Ttied-aidn concept in
the bilateral foreign aid program.
been successful up to a point.

Each of these measures has

However, their effectiveness

seems to have been reduced not so much because there has been
disagreement and resistance from those feeling themselves ma
ligned, but more so because these are primarily national mea
sures.

Their results, however, are contingent upon external as

well as internal policies and situations.

Since national policy

decisions cannot be implemented in a vacuum but are inevitably
affected by international circumstances, these measures have
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failed to achieve their objective, to transform the United States
from a debtor to a strong creditor nation.
Similarly, international decisions cannot be effective
without extensive national cooperation and support.

If it is

necessary to consider foreign economic policies in improving the
American balance-of-payments situation, it is equally important
for international agencies realistically to consider the feasi
bility of their proposals within the individual countries.
is particularly so in relation to the United States.

This

Emphasis

is placed on the United States because it is in the precarious
position of being both a key-reserve country and a debtor nation.
Such economic policies have a splintering effect.

Any major

economic policy decision regarding the American balance of
payments may reverberate throughout the world as well as the
nation.

Moreover, improvement of the balance-of-payments

situation is further hampered by the restraints of these cir
cumstances.

Being both a key-currency country and sustaining

a deficit restricts flexibility and timely responses.
In conclusion, the American balanee-of-payments problem
in the post-World War II era might have been solved rather
quickly through the application of one or several drastic mea
sures.

However, a national consensus has not emerged to warrant

such action.

It is doubtful that such drastic measures would be

politically acceptable.

In other words, the American attitude

has been that this is a serious matter but not one of crisis
proportions.

Moreover, there has been a lack of adequate and
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analytical material to explain this complex subject and enlighten
the American public on the possible remedies.
In short, alternatives have not been widely understood
within the United States.

This does not seem surprising, how

ever, when the considerable amount of disagreement existing
among authorities and scholars is taken into account.

For this

same reason, it is not anticipated that comprehensive reform
will be implemented either nationally or internationally in the
immediate future.

Rather, it is to be expected that the balance -

of-payments disequilibrium, although diminished, will persist
until either an international crisis develops or the payments
problem cures itself over a long period of time.

Probably this

would be over a longer period of time than the United States
Government has indicated in the past that it is willing to wait.
This latter option of the payments problem curing itself
seems more likely to be the ultimate resolution to the problem.
This conclusion relates more to attitude than arithmetic, for in
the United States primary emphasis centers on a balance of in
terests rather than of payments.

Government necessarily must

assume the role of mediator between conflicting interests and
realize some balance of interests.

Of the causes deemed re

sponsible, domestic inflation is cited most often as the crux
of the chronic balance-of-payments problem.

American opinion

condemns inflation only so long as it is impersonal.

When the

issue becomes personal, and employment, wages, and domestic
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markets shrink, then the predominance of the balance-of-payments
problem likewise diminishes.
Furthermore, commitment to long-range economic develop
ment has been repeatedly made by Democratic and Republican
Administrations alike throughout the I960’s and 1970’s.

While

Congress has expressed no similar commitment as a body and,
indeed, has reduced Administration requests, it has not been
inclined to discard its international investment at this point.
With this internal situation, attention turns to international
options, which equally require negotiations and an agreeable
balancing of interests.

Liberalized trade, assumption of a

larger role in foreign aid by surplus nations, and intentional
measures by surplus countries to assist deficit countries, all
imply a quid pro quo relationship.
Finally, the choices available are limited and the
possible repercussions are inhibitive.

In making these choices,

the United States is essentially grappling with a problem at
least as political as it is economic.

These choices are neither

abstractions nor impersonal, for they affect all Americans very
personally.

In this complex arena of overlapping domestic and

foreign policy, no panacea lias emerged, nor is one expected.
Rather, it seems more likely that United States economic policy
will continue to respond cautiously and appear to do no more than
'muddle through.’

Given the context and magnitude of the prob

lem, however, this possibility does not seem to be overly per
plexing or altogether undesirable.
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Since World War II, the American balance-of-payments
situation has presented a multifaceted problem.

This study is

an attempt to show some of the interrelated and overlapping
political, economic, military and diplomatic aspects of this
problem.

Of the key factors involved, international trade and

foreign aid programs have been of primary significance.

Pro

posed solutions, however, have reflected highly diverse opinion
on both the national and international levels.
No immediate resolution to the problem has emerged,
partly because of the democratic system of government in the
United States and partly because of the limited reforms which
have been agreed to in the international monetary system.

It

is not expected that this problem will be solved easily or
quickly for two reasons.

First, the failure to curb adequately

domestic inflation has reduced American competitiveness in

1

world markets, and, secondly, a continuing commitment to the
foreign aid program has been made.
Finally, recurring crises in the future are a very real
possibility.

Given the complexity of the problem, however,

careful deliberation and experimentation seem warranted even at
the expense of immediate resolution.
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